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REINVENTING THE “LEGISLATIVE INTENT, OR RATHER THE 
LEGISLATIVE MANDATE” ON DRAM SHOP LIABILITY IN 
MISSOURI: A LOOK AT KILMER V. MUN* 
Litigation is easiest when strong facts mesh with firm law, but a good lawyer 
can make do with either strong facts or firm law.  At first blush, [he] had 
neither.  . . . With facts as weak as in [this case], it would have been difficult 
for most judges to move the doctrine along in the direction that [he] wished.  
Normally, strong facts drag the doctrine with them.  Yet, here again [his] craft 
shows how much can be done with just a few raw materials. 
– Alfred S. Konefsky1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The facts of Kilmer v. Mun2 read like those of so many other dram shop 
cases in Missouri legal history.3  Between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 
midnight on February 26, 1998, Hui Chan Mun partook of pitchers of beer on 
his birthday at Stefanina’s Pizzeria and Restaurant in O’Fallon, Missouri.4  
 
* This Note, by Michael L. Young, was selected as the Best Student Work to appear in Volume 45 
of the Saint Louis University Law Journal. 
 1. The above quote by Alfred S. Konefsky was a comment on the remarkable ability of 
Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo to develop the principle of promissory estoppel in New York 
state law with little in the way of facts or legal doctrine to support him.  See Alfred S. Konefsky, 
How to Read, Or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the Allegheny College Case, 36 BUFF. L. 
REV. 645, 683, 686 (1987); Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 
(N.Y. 1927). 
 2. 17 S.W.3d 545 (Mo. 2000). 
 3. Nearly every Missouri case that discusses dram shop liability involves an individual 
defendant who patronized a tavern or a cocktail lounge featuring such a sleazy name that the 
name itself seemed to forewarn of the irresponsible behavior which would follow, such as the Ten 
Pin Lounge, the Kozy Inn, the End Zone Lounge, the King of Clubs, the Water Wheel Lounge, 
and the Prospect.  The defendant typically drank an excess number of alcoholic beverages, 
attempted to drive his motor vehicle home, and then recklessly caused an automobile collision 
with the plaintiff, or with the plaintiff’s deceased family member.  See Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 
545 (Mo. 2000); Simpson v. Kilcher, 749 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. 1988); Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 
570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Nesbitt v. Westport Square, Ltd., 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); 
Sampson v. W.F. Enter., Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Moore v. Riley, 487 S.W.2d 
555 (Mo. 1972). 
 4. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 546; Michele Munz, Woman, 3 Young Daughters Seek 
Damages in Death of Their Husband and Father: Man Will Face Trial in Fatal Crash, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, ST. CHARLES COUNTY POST, Oct. 30, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Munz, 3 Young 
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After leaving the restaurant intoxicated, Mun drove his Jeep Cherokee down 
the wrong side of Interstate 64, where he collided with a Ford Escort driven by 
Thomas Kilmer.5  Kilmer died at the scene.6  Mun was later convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter.7 
The Kilmer family, his wife and children, acquired an affidavit from Dr. 
Mary Case, the pathologist who testified at Mun’s criminal trial.8  In the 
affidavit, Dr. Case opined that, before consuming his last drink, Mun’s blood 
alcohol content would have been between 0.136% and 0.142% and, prior to his 
second to last drink his blood alcohol content would have been between 
0.112% and 0.118%.9  At these blood alcohol levels, Mun would have 
“exhibited outward signs of intoxication including diminished judgment, 
decreased inhibitions, impaired perception, memory and comprehension.”10  
Although Kilmer’s family asked the local St. Charles County prosecutor to 
bring a criminal action against Stefanina’s, the prosecutor declined to do so.11 
 
Daughters]; Michele Munz, Second Jury Convicts Man in Hwy. 40 Traffic Death: Involuntary 
Manslaughter is the Verdict in Crash Last Year that Killed Man, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, ST. 
CHARLES COUNTY POST, Feb. 12, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Munz, Second Jury Convicts]. 
 5. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 546; Michele Munz, Man Faces Involuntary Manslaughter 
Charges in Drunk-Driving Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, ST. CHARLES COUNTY POST, Jun. 
9, 1998, at 1.  On the date of the collision, Mun was driving on a suspended driver’s license, 
which had been revoked in October 1997 after his refusal to take a breathalyzer test.  See Leilani 
Nisperos, Man is on Trial for Manslaughter in Hwy. 40 Crash, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, ST. 
CHARLES COUNTY POST, Dec. 1, 1998, at 3. 
 6. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 546. 
 7. See id.  Mun actually faced two criminal trials for involuntary manslaughter.  The first 
one ended with a mistrial as the jury could not reach an unanimous verdict.  Mun was convicted 
at his second trial.  See Munz, Second Jury Convicts, supra note 4, at 1.  Mun’s defense in his 
criminal trials was that he was “confused by the road signs” and that the blood samples taken by 
investigators were inaccurate.  See Michele Munz, Law and Order, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
ST. CHARLES COUNTY POST, Feb. 10, 1999, at 3.  At his sentencing hearing, Judge Lucy Rauch, 
after listening to testimony from Kilmer’s wife and oldest daughter, sentenced Mun to seven 
years of incarceration, the maximum amount Rauch could have ordered.  See Michele Munz, 
Drunk Driver Gets 7-Year Term in 1998 Death of O’Fallon Man, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, ST. 
CHARLES COUNTY POST, Apr. 12, 1999, at 1. 
 8. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 546. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Id.  At Mun’s first criminal trial, St. Charles County Ambulance District paramedic 
Kimberlyn Oehlert testified that Mun told her at the scene of the accident that he drank only three 
beers that evening.  See Leilani Nisperos, Testimony Focuses on Defendant’s Condition in Fatal 
Crash on Hwy. 40, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, ST. CHARLES COUNTY POST, Dec. 2, 1998, at 1.  
Other testimony indicated that Mun drank three pitchers of beer with two of his friends in an hour 
and a half period of time.  The restaurant owner testified at the second trial that three pitchers of 
beer contained about eighteen beers.  One of Mun’s friends claimed at the second trial that they 
had “‘slammed’ the last one on the way out the door.”  See Munz, Second Jury Convicts, supra 
note 4, at 1. 
 11. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 546-47. 
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The Kilmer family filed a wrongful death suit against Stefanina’s alleging 
that Mr. Kilmer’s death was the result of Stefanina’s serving alcohol to Mun, 
who was obviously intoxicated.12  The Circuit Court of St. Charles County 
granted Stefanina’s motion for summary judgment because section 537.053 of 
the Revised Statutes of Missouri13 eliminates dram shop liability except where 
the tavern or restaurant has received a criminal conviction for its actions under 
section 311.310 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.14  Without a criminal 
conviction, the Kilmer family had no cause of action against Stefanina’s. 
 
 12. See id. at 547.  “Maria Kilmer said she cannot put a price tag on the loss of her husband, 
Tom Kilmer, but she said she has to think about the future of their three young daughters.”  
Munz, 3 Young Daughters, supra note 4, at 1. 
 13. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 547.  Section 537.053 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 
passed in 1985, provides as follows: 
1.  Since the repeal of the Missouri Dram Shop Act in 1934 (Laws of 1933-34, extra 
session, page 77), it has been and continues to be the policy of this state to follow the 
common law of England, as declared in section 1.010, RSMo, to prohibit dram shop 
liability and to follow the common law rule that furnishing alcoholic beverages is not the 
proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons. 
2.  The legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings 
in cases such as Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Sampson v. 
W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); and Nesbitt v. Westport 
Square, Ltd., 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) be abrogated in favor of prior judicial 
interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than the furnishing 
of alcoholic beverages, to be the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an 
intoxicated person. 
3.  Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2 of the section, a cause of action may be brought 
by or on behalf of any person who has suffered personal injury or death against any 
person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor by the drink for consumption on the premises 
who, pursuant to section 311.310, RSMo, has been convicted, or has received a suspended 
imposition of the sentence arising from the conviction, of the sale of intoxicating liquor to 
a person under the age of twenty-one years or an obviously intoxicated person if the sale 
of such intoxicating liquor is the proximate cause of the personal injury or death sustained 
by such person. 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.053 (West 2000). 
 14. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 547.  Section 311.310 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 
passed in 1990, provides as follows: 
Any licensee under the chapter, or his employee, who shall sell, vend, give away or 
otherwise supply any intoxicating liquor in any quantity whatsoever to any person under 
the age of twenty-one years, or to any person intoxicated or appearing to be in a state of 
intoxication, or to a habitual drunkard, and any person whomsoever except his parent or 
guardian who shall procure for, sell, give away or otherwise supply intoxicating liquor to 
any person under the age of twenty-one years, or to any intoxicated person or any person 
appearing to be in a state of intoxication, or to a habitual drunkard, shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor, except that this section shall not apply to the supplying of intoxicating 
liquor to a person under the age of twenty-one years for medical purposes only, or to the 
administering of such intoxicating liquor to any person by a duly licensed physician.  No 
person shall be denied a license or renewal of a license under this chapter solely due to a 
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The Missouri Supreme Court overruled the decision of the trial court, 
holding that the criminal conviction requirement of section 537.053 violated 
the “open courts” provision in the Missouri Constitution.15  The Court held that 
the criminal conviction requirement erected an “arbitrary” and “unreasonable” 
barrier to causes of action against taverns and restaurants like those brought by 
the Kilmer family and that the criminal conviction requirement violated the 
separation of powers outlined in the Missouri Constitution by delegating 
legislative and judicial power to local prosecutors.16  The Kilmer majority held 
that the criminal conviction requirement was severable from the statute and 
allowed the Kilmers to pursue their claim against Stefanina’s.17 
The Court’s opinion in Kilmer did not merely expand dram shop liability 
in Missouri.  Indeed, the opinion capped a high water mark in the struggle 
between the Missouri state judiciary and legislature over not only the volatile 
issue of dram shop liability, but also the powers that each branch of 
government possesses in creating and limiting tort law causes of action. 
In order to fully explore the rationale and impact of the Kilmer opinion on 
Missouri law, this Note attempts to accomplish five interrelated goals.  First, 
this Note discusses the history of dram shop liability in Missouri since its 
inception as a state because the history plays a crucial role in the majority’s 
analysis in Kilmer.18  Second, this Note analyzes the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Kilmer, critiquing especially: (1) the reasoning the majority 
employs to analyze the legal forms of the dram shop statute; (2) the majority’s 
interpretation of the legislative intent with regard to dram shop liability; and 
(3) how the majority reconciles the differences between its view of 
constitutional principles and the dram shop statutory language in question.  
Third, this Note offers insight as to why the majority provides such an 
extraordinarily activist opinion in this case.  Fourth, this Note attempts to show 
 
conviction for unlawful sale or supply to a minor when serving in the capacity as an 
employee of a licensed establishment. 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 311.310 (West 1994). 
 15. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 552.  Article I, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution states: 
“That the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every 
injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without 
sale, denial or delay.”  MO. CONST. art. I, § 14. 
 16. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 552-53. 
 17. See id. at 553-54. 
 18. For the purposes of this Note, the liability of social hosts who provide alcoholic 
beverages, rather than of commercial sellers of alcohol, will not be discussed.  For a discussion of 
social host liability in Missouri, see Cristhia Lehr Mast, Social Host Liability in Missouri, 53 MO. 
L. REV. 839 (1988); Debra S. O’Neal, Missouri: Dram Shop and Social Host Liability Rejected, 
56 UMKC L. REV. 423 (1988); David A. Stratmann, Paying for Letting Friends Drive Drunk: 
Third Party Liability for the Negligent Acts of Drunken Drivers, 51 MO. L. REV. 273 (1986); 
Steven A. Ramirez, Social Host Liability and Missouri Tort Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 
(1985). 
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how the holding delivered in Kilmer could affect other Missouri statutory law, 
such as Missouri’s Nursing Home Act.19  Finally, this Note suggests a method 
the Missouri legislature can use to meet its goals in limiting litigation without 
violating the constitutional barriers created by the Kilmer decision. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DRAM SHOP LIABILITY IN MISSOURI 
Traditionally at common law, the act of a tavern owner in selling alcoholic 
beverages “to a patron did not give rise to a civil cause of action either by the 
patron himself or by any third person who might suffer injury from acts done 
by the patron while in an intoxicated condition.”20  Common law courts 
reasoned that taverns and restaurants were not liable for injuries suffered by 
the patron or a third party because the proximate cause of the injuries was the 
patron’s consumption of alcoholic beverages, and that patron’s negligent 
driving or other behavior, not the tavern or restaurant owner’s sale of the 
beverages.21 
A. Skinner v. Hughes 
The earliest Missouri case to address the issue of alcohol providers’ 
liability for the injuries caused by their patrons arose during the pre-civil war 
era, in an 1850 case styled Skinner v. Hughes.22  The plaintiff, Mrs. Hughes, 
filed suit against the defendant store and mill owners, Skinner and Shephard, 
for damages she sustained from the death of her slave Willis.23  According to 
the opinion, Willis had purchased a quart of whiskey from Skinner and 
Shephard’s clerk, Baker, and consumed the whiskey along with Skinner and 
Shephard’s white mill hands.24  Once Willis “got drunk,” he attempted to walk 
home around sun down.25  Willis was found the next morning “lying on his 
face in the road not far from the mill speechless, his jaws locked and frozen 
nearly to death.”26  He died eight or nine days later.27  The court in Skinner, 
rather grotesquely by today’s standards, compared Baker’s selling of alcohol to 
 
 19. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 198.003-198.186 (1979). 
 20. Sampson v. W.F. Enter., Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 21. See id. 
 22. 13 Mo. 440 (1850). 
 23. See id. at 441. 
 24. See id.  The clerk and mill owners apparently made a fair profit out of selling alcoholic 
beverages to slaves whose owners had various business with the mill.  Though a permit was 
required from a slave’s owner before the slave could purchase alcohol, the clerk in Skinner “was 
in the habit of selling whiskey to the slaves without the permission of the owners and Shephard 
[the mill owner] was frequently present when this was done and made no objection.”  Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. 
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Willis to “placing noxious food within reach of domestic animals.”28  The 
court, therefore, found that the defendants were liable for the plaintiff’s 
damages, holding that “we regard the death of the slave as the natural 
consequence of the act of the defendants in providing him with the means of 
intoxication.”29  Both Missouri case law in dicta and legal commentators have 
argued that Skinner demonstrates that Missouri never adopted and had, in fact, 
apparently rejected the traditional common law “proximate cause” rule.30 
B. Prohibition and the Dram Shop Liability Act 
After the Skinner case, Missouri law remained silent on dram shop liability 
until the passage of the Dram Shop Act in 1919.31  A product of the Prohibition 
 
 28. Id. at 443.  Racism against African Americans has also surfaced at other times in the 
development of American law and social policy with regards to alcohol consumption.  For 
example, the prohibition of alcohol movement in the South in the early twentieth century was 
fueled in a significant way by the “fear that black men, stimulated by alcohol, would attack white 
women.”  During the debates on whether to pass a prohibitionist amendment to the United States 
Constitution in the House of Representatives, Congressman Hobson from Alabama explained: 
“Liquor will actually make a brute out of the Negro, causing him to commit unnatural crimes.  
The effect is the same on the white man, though the white man being further evolved it takes a 
longer time to reduce him to the same level.”  ANDREW BARR, DRINK: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
AMERICA 253 n.12 (1999). 
 29. Skinner, 13 Mo. at 443. 
 30. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 551; Carver, 647 S.W.2d at 573; Ramirez, supra note 18, at 
521, 526.  Such a reading of Skinner, however, is far too broad because it glosses over the 
historical context in which the opinion was written.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.b. 
 31. See MO. REV. STAT. § 6593 (recodified as § 4487 in 1929, but repealed in 1934) (1919).  
The Dram Shop Statute provided as follows: 
Every wife, husband, child, parent, guardian, or other person in the state of Missouri, who 
shall be injured in person or property or means of support or otherwise by any intoxicated 
person by reason of the selling of intoxicating liquors in violation of the provisions of this 
article, shall have the right of action in his or her name against any person, firm or 
corporation who shall, by such illegal selling of such liquors, have caused or contributed 
to the intoxication of said person or persons, or who have caused or contributed to any 
such injury; and in any action given by this section the plaintiff shall have the right to 
recover actual and exemplary damages.  In case of the death of either party, the action or 
right of action given by this section shall survive to and against his or her executor or 
administrator; and in every action by husband, wife, parent, child, the general reputation 
of the relation of husband, wife, parent, child, shall be prima facie evidence of such 
relation, and the amount so recovered by either wife or child shall be his or her sole and 
separate property.  Such damages, together with the costs of suit, shall be recoverable in 
an action before any court of competent jurisdiction in this state; and in any case where 
parents shall be entitled to such damages, either the father or mother may sue alone 
therefor, but recovery by one of such parents shall be a bar to any suit brought by the 
other for such damages; and in any case where two or more children may be entitled to 
such damages, only one suit therefor may be brought and the separate claims for damages 
may be united under separate counts in the one action. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 6593 (1919). 
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era,32 the Dram Shop Act was only one piece of a larger legislative scheme to 
prohibit the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages in the state of 
Missouri.  Missouri statutes in 1919 made it unlawful for individuals or 
businesses to “manufacture, sell, give away or transport intoxicating liquors 
within, import the same into, or export the same from the state of Missouri for 
beverages purposes.”33  Those guilty of violating this prohibitionist mandate 
could face criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment.34  The Dram 
Shop Act allowed individuals, including members of the intoxicated person’s 
family, who suffered injuries (including loss of support) as a result of the 
conduct of intoxicated persons to bring civil actions against those individuals 
or businesses who had sold the intoxicated persons their illegal liquor.35  Thus, 
Missouri statutory law established that selling alcoholic beverages was a 
criminal offense.  Furthermore, the statutory scheme allowed individuals who 
had been injured by intoxicated persons to bring civil suits for damages against 
those persons or businesses who had sold the intoxicated person his or her 
illegal alcoholic beverages.36 
C. Repeal of Prohibition and the Dram Shop Liability Act 
When Prohibition was repealed nationwide in 1934, the Missouri Dram 
Shop Act, which allowed civil actions against the sellers of alcoholic 
beverages, was also repealed.37  The Missouri legislature still kept it illegal to 
sell alcoholic beverages to “habitual drunkards,” a person “under or apparently 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor” and anyone under the age of twenty-
one years.38  However, a direct, statutorily-authorized private right of action 
against dram shop providers for the negligent acts of their intoxicated patrons 
was specifically removed in 1934 with the end of Prohibition, even if the 
alcohol was illegally sold to minors or habitual drunkards.39  The general 
statutory scheme for regulating alcohol sales and consumption—namely the 
state regulation of the production and sale of alcoholic beverages, criminal 
 
 32. The Dram Shop Act became effective on the same day that prohibition became effective 
in the United States with the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1919.  
The Dram Shop Act was repealed at the same time the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed in 
1934.  See William F. Ford, Jr., Alcohol Supplier’s Liability in Missouri, J. MO. B., Apr.-May 
1989, at 193. 
 33. MO. REV. STAT. § 6588 (1919). 
 34. See id. §§ 6594-6604 (1919). 
 35. See id. § 6593 (1919). 
 36. Far from limiting a cause of action, the 1919 Act created a new tort cause of action.  See 
discussion infra Part IV.B.4.b. 
 37. See Ford, supra note 32, at 193. 
 38. 1934-34 Mo. Laws (Extra Session) Intoxicating Liquors: Relating to the Regulation, 
Control, Manufacture, Brewing, Sale, Possession, Transportation and Distribution of Intoxicating 
Liquor § 9, at 81. 
 39. Id. § 44, at 92. 
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penalties for bars or restaurants that sold alcoholic beverages to minors, 
habitual drunkards and the apparently intoxicated and the omission of any 
direct statutory authorization for civil actions for violations of these criminal 
offenses—remained largely in place until the 1980s.40 
D. Abrogation of the Common Law Rule in the 1980s 
By the 1980s, the dangers and horrible carnage that drunk driving 
produced on American roadways rose to the center stage of American 
politics.41  During the early part of the 1980s, the Courts of Appeals in 
Missouri gradually adopted the decision made by over twenty-seven 
jurisdictions in the United States in abrogating the traditional common law 
“proximate cause” rule that had prohibited suits against dram shop owners.42 
In the 1980 case Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc.,43 the Missouri Court 
of Appeals began the process of abrogating the traditional common law rule 
prohibiting civil actions against dram shop owners.  In Sampson, Earl Anthony 
Sampson, a twenty-year-old minor, visited two different cocktail lounges, Paul 
and Jacks cocktail lounge and the Kozy Inn, where he purchased and 
consumed alcoholic beverages on the premises of both establishments.44  Earl 
subsequently collected his pickup truck from Allen Chevrolet and attempted to 
travel east on Highway 210.45  Earl’s truck veered off the highway and onto the 
shoulder of the road, turning over in a gully.46  Earl died from the accident.47  
 
 40. To be most accurate, the change in Missouri’s general scheme for regulating alcohol 
consumption began in dicta in Moore v. Riley.  487 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. 1972).  See discussion infra 
Part II.D and note 50.  Curiously, it appears that no Missouri case after the repeal of the 
Prohibition-era dram shop liability statute and before the 1980s abrogation cases directly 
reiterated the traditional common law “proximate cause” rule.  See Moore, 487 S.W.2d at 558.  
“No recent Missouri case dealing with violation of liquor control laws as a ground for tort 
liability has been cited by the parties.”  Id.  See also Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461, 
463 (8th Cir. 1978).  “There are no Missouri cases dealing with the issue of whether a tavern 
owner who knowingly sells intoxicating liquor to an intoxicated person or to a minor is liable for 
personal injuries inflicted by that intoxicated person or minor on an innocent third party.”  Id.  
Nonetheless, for a discussion of why dram shop liability during this period should have been 
considered legally nonexistent, see discussion infra Part IV.B.4.b. 
 41. See Richard Smith, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for 
Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 556 (2000).  By 1982, the Presidential Commission on 
Drunk Driving estimated that over fifty percent of highway fatalities resulted from motorists 
driving under the influence of alcohol, causing on average over 25,000 fatalities per year.  
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON DRUNK DRIVING, AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE NATION (1982).  But 
see JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 27-41 (1989), for a discussion 
of the “methodological difficulties” in attributing highway fatalities to drunk driving. 
 42. See Smith, supra note 41, at 556. 
 43. 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 44. See id. at 334. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
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His parents brought a wrongful death action against the owners of the cocktail 
lounges and the Chevrolet dealership that had allowed Earl to drive away in 
spite of his intoxicated condition.48 
In holding that Earl’s parents could bring a wrongful death claim against 
the owners of the cocktail lounges, the court in Sampson essentially adopted a 
line of reasoning that the Missouri Supreme Court had first proposed, but had 
not yet adopted, in a 1972 case, Moore v. Riley.49  The Sampson court adopted 
the principle stated in Moore that Missouri recognized a cause of action for 
civil damages “based upon an act which is in violation of a criminal statute or 
ordinance” if the person injured was “one of the class for whose benefit an 
ordinance was adopted” and if the ordinance had “been enacted to protect 
persons or property, conserve public health or promote public safety.”50  As 
mentioned earlier, Missouri statutes, specifically section 311.310 of the 
Revised Statutes of Missouri, forbid the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons 
under the age of twenty-one.51  As in Moore, the Sampson court held that in 
forbidding alcohol sales to minors, this statute intended to protect “minors 
against exposure to liquor traffic” and to support the “public policy of 
excluding minors for their own benefit, from the use of intoxicating liquors.”52  
Since the facts in this case satisfied both parts of the Moore test, the court in 
Sampson held that a minor, or his family under the wrongful death statute, 
could bring a cause of action for injuries that the minor suffered as a result of 
becoming intoxicated from alcoholic beverages sold to him by a tavern or 
restaurant.53  With this negligence per se argument, the court in Sampson 
found a dram shop owner liable for the first time in Missouri since the repeal 
of the Dram Shop Act in 1934. 
 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Sampson, 611 S.W.2d at 334.  The court in Sampson sustained the Chevrolet 
dealership’s motion to dismiss.  The plaintiffs argued that the dealership was liable for damages 
because the dealership negligently entrusted Earl with the pickup truck.  The court held that 
liability under this theory arises only when the defendant has a right of control over the item 
entrusted.  The court further held that a bailee, which was the role of the dealership in this case, 
does not hold the “right of control” necessary for liability under negligent entrustment and thus, 
did not find the dealership liable here.  See id. at 338-39. 
 49. See id. at 336-38; see generally Moore v. Riley, 487 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. 1972). 
 50. Sampson, 611 S.W.2d at 336.  The court in Moore did not officially hand down this 
negligence per se rule because the plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence that the minor 
defendant had consumed or purchased alcoholic beverages in the defendant’s tavern and thus, in 
violation of Missouri liquor law.  Moore, 487 S.W.2d at 558-59. 
 51. See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.310 (1990). 
 52. Sampson, 611 S.W.2d at 336. 
 53. Id. at 336-37.  The court also noted, however, that the defendants could allege Earl’s 
contributory negligence as an affirmative defense, which, if proven, could have operated as a 
complete bar to the plaintiff’s cause of action.  Id. at 337.  The Missouri Supreme Court would 
later fully replace the rule of contributory negligence as a complete bar with a system of 
comparative fault.  See Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1983). 
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One year later, in Nesbitt v. Westport Square, Ltd.,54 the Missouri Court of 
Appeals faced a slightly different fact pattern.  Eighteen-year-old Susan Sperry 
had been served alcoholic beverages at a bar called The Prospect and was 
subsequently involved in an automobile accident.55  In this case, the defendant 
again was the dram shop, The Prospect.  The plaintiff, however, was not the 
minor driver Susan, but was instead Julie Nesbitt, a passenger in Susan’s 
automobile.56  Because The Prospect had sold alcoholic beverages to Susan in 
violation of section 311.310 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, and because 
third parties injured by intoxicated persons were held to be within the statute’s 
protected class, the court in Nesbitt held that the line of reasoning adopted in 
Sampson applied in this case, thereby allowing a third party to bring a cause of 
action against The Prospect.57  By 1981, the Missouri Court of Appeals had 
abrogated the common law “proximate cause” rule in favor of a negligence per 
se theory to allow either patrons or third parties to bring civil actions against 
dram shop owners for injuries that they suffered as a result of the patrons’ 
intoxication, so long as those dram shop owners sold alcoholic beverages to 
their patrons in violation of section 311.310. 
In 1983, the Missouri Court of Appeals addressed the issue of dram shop 
liability in a case styled Carver v. Schafer58 with facts similar to, yet in ways 
significantly different from, Nesbitt.  William M. Schafer was served alcoholic 
beverages by two Illinois taverns, the Little Dover Inn and The Ten Pin 
Lounge.59  While driving back to Missouri on Interstate Highway 270, the 
intoxicated Schafer struck and killed James R. Reifschneider, a St. Louis 
County police officer who was standing on the shoulder of the highway issuing 
a traffic ticket to another motorist.60  Reifschneider’s family brought a 
wrongful death claim against both Schafer and the owners of the Little Dover 
Inn and The Ten Pin Lounge.61  Unlike in Sampson and Nesbitt, the negligence 
per se rule would not entitle the plaintiffs to bring a cause of action against the 
tavern owners, because section 311.310 only applied to Missouri taverns and 
restaurants, not to taverns and restaurants located outside the state.62  If section 
311.310 did not apply to the Little Dover Inn and The Ten Pin Lounge, then 
these taverns could not violate section 311.310 and thus, the negligence per se 
theory of liability could not apply. 
 
 54. 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
 55. Id. at 519. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 520. 
 58. 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 59. Id. at 572. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 571. 
 62. See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.310 (1990). 
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Instead of relying on a negligence per se theory, the court in Carver found 
that the plaintiffs could bring a civil action against the tavern owners by 
expanding the duty of care dram shop owners owe to the public when selling 
alcoholic beverages to their customers.63  Carver held that each individual had 
a duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of others in every human act, 
including the “exercise of such precautions as are commensurate with the 
dangers reasonably to be anticipated under the circumstances.”64  After 
reviewing statistics on drunk drivers and their impact upon traffic accidents 
and injuries, the court reasoned that it was foreseeable that tavern patrons 
would drive to and from a tavern; furthermore, it was foreseeable that a drunk 
driver would be more likely to be involved in an accident than a sober driver.65  
With this in mind, the court found that the tavern owners had a duty to avoid 
supplying Schafer with alcoholic beverages once it became apparent that 
Schafer was intoxicated.66  No longer relying on a negligence per se theory, the 
court in Carver attached liability to dram shop owners by holding that tavern 
owners had a duty of care to stop serving alcoholic beverages to intoxicated 
persons.  With this decision in 1983, the Missouri Court of Appeals had 
completely abrogated the traditional common law rule of “proximate cause” in 
favor of a new, extended duty of care for dram shop owners. 
E. The Dram Shop Liability Statute of 1985 
With these early 1980s rulings from the Court of Appeals, Missouri joined 
an increasing number of states that by case law or statute had placed liability 
upon dram shop owners, who negligently sold alcoholic beverages to minors or 
apparently intoxicated people, for the injuries that occurred to the intoxicated 
patron or to third parties injured by the alcohol-induced negligence of the 
patron.67  As a result of these new statutes and court rulings, the amount of 
litigation nationwide involving restaurants and taverns in drunk driving cases 
skyrocketed.68  Anti-drinking and driving groups, such as Mothers Against 
 
 63. Carver, 647 S.W.2d at 575. 
 64. Id. at 573. The court stated that “[i]ndeed, one would have to be a hermit to be unaware 
of the carnage caused by drunken motorists.”  Id.  The court in Carver cited with approval a 
description of the drunk driving problem issued in the 1964 Missouri Court of Appeals case Crull 
v. Gleb: 
Our highway safety problems have greatly increased.  Death and destruction stalk our 
roads.  The peaceful Sunday afternoon family drive through the hills has been abandoned 
by many as the result of brushes with near death at the hands of half-baked morons 
drunkenly weaving in and out of traffic at 80 or 90 miles per hour. 
Id. (citing Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 575. 
 67. See Smith, supra note 41, at 556; Suits Against Those Who Serve Alcohol Are 
Increasing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 11, 1985, at 11D. 
 68. Suits Against Those Who Serve Alcohol Are Increasing, supra note 67. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
636 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:625 
Drunk Driving (“MADD”), saw this increased litigation as an effective means 
to curb drunk driving accidents.69  According to Anne K. Seymour of MADD, 
“It is making [tavern and restaurant owners] aware of the fact that they can 
potentially be held liable for a drunken driving accident.”70 
Insurance companies doing business in Missouri soon became aware of 
this potential liability as well.  Because of the new possibilities for liability and 
the relative uncertainty surrounding what circumstances would give rise to this 
new liability, Missouri restaurants and taverns found it more difficult to obtain 
affordable insurance plans.71  Some restaurant industry experts and lobbyists 
claimed that some establishments could not get any insurance.72  As a result, 
the Missouri legislature responded. 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Jerry Morlock, Foes of Drunk Driving Challenge 3 Bills: Proposed Legislation 
Involves Liquor Sales, Tavern Liability, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 10, 1985, at B1; John A. 
Dvorak, Measure Putting Limits on Restaurant Lawsuits Becomes Law, KANSAS CITY TIMES, 
June 13, 1985, at B1.  Over a decade later, after the court in Kilmer held Missouri’s dram statute 
to be unconstitutional and thus reinstated full dram shop liability, the reaction from the restaurant 
industry was similar.  According to Kansas City restaurant owner Bill Nigro, “[t]he first thing I 
think is that my liability insurance, which is already high, is going to go up.”  Missouri Restaurant 
Association Vice-President John Pelzer said that the Kilmer decision constituted “poor public 
policy” and that the association would look into “appropriate action and remedies.”  Joe Lambe & 
Eric Palmer, Bars Exposed to Lawsuits in Missouri; Those Hurt by Drunken Drivers Can Sue, 
KANSAS CITY STAR, May 11, 2000, at A1. 
 72. Dvorak, supra note 71, at B1.  In their coverage of the passage of the new dram shop 
liability statute, all of the major St. Louis and Kansas City newspapers remained mysteriously 
silent on the role that the St. Louis, Missouri, based beer brewer Anheuser-Busch may have 
played in lobbying for the statute.  Certainly, Anheuser-Busch would have held a strong interest 
in this new bill.  If the courts began finding restaurants liable for their negligent sale of alcoholic 
beverages, some of these restaurants may have decided to sell less or perhaps no alcoholic 
beverages, such as beer, in order to reduce their liability exposure.  Any sort of reduction in beer 
sales at restaurants would have affected Anheuser-Busch’s bottom-line.  Moreover, Anheuser-
Busch had proven itself an effective lobbyist with the Missouri legislature, such as in its past 
efforts to prevent the passage of a bill which would prohibit a driver from having an open 
alcoholic beverage container in his or her car.  Peter Hernon and Terry Ganey have written on 
Anheuser-Busch’s past legislative successes: 
In a few states, a minority that has included Missouri, where the company’s largest 
brewery is located, it was perfectly legal to drink a beer while driving in a car.  Year after 
year state legislators like Chris Kelly introduced bills to stop the practice.  And year after 
year the powerful Anheuser-Busch lobby opposed and helped to defeat them.  In one 
memorable exchange, the company’s lobbyist, John Britton, offered what might be called 
the peanut butter defense.  The real problem, Britton deftly suggested, had nothing to do 
with driving while drinking an alcoholic beverage that might impair reflexes.  The real 
problem was the fact that the driver’s hand is wrapped around a beer can instead of the 
steering wheel.  In that context, a peanut butter sandwich was just as dangerous as a beer, 
Britton argued.  The Missouri legislature bought the argument. 
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Senator Henry Panethiere, a Democrat from Kansas City, introduced 
legislation into the Missouri Senate in February 1985 designed to limit 
restaurant and tavern liability in these dram shop cases.73  As originally 
introduced on the Senate floor, Panethiere’s proposed legislation, Senate Bill 
345,74 allowed third parties, but not the actual intoxicated patron injured as a 
result of his own intoxication, to bring civil actions against restaurants and 
bars, but limited the damages one could receive to $25,000.75  When Senate 
Bill 345 resurfaced from the Committee on Banking, Commerce and Tourism, 
however, it was drastically different.76  The committee version of Senate Bill 
345 declared that since the repeal of the Missouri dram shop act in 1934, “it 
has been and continues to be the policy of the State of Missouri to prohibit 
dram shop liability either by statute or judicial decision.”77  The committee 
version removed any injured third party’s or patron’s cause of action against a 
person or business which “advertised, sold, or gave” alcoholic beverages to 
that patron.78  This version of Senate Bill 345 would have eliminated dram 
shop liability altogether, effectively reinstating the traditional common law 
“proximate cause” rule. 
However, competing interests surfaced with the development of this 
statute.  Passing a bill that completely eliminated a tavern’s liability to 
innocent third parties would have been a risky political move to make during a 
period of time when public consciousness concerning drunken driving had 
never been higher.  The political ramifications of eliminating tavern liability 
would not have gone unnoticed at the Governor’s Mansion either, especially 
considering then Governor John Ashcroft’s much lauded personal and religious 
beliefs about the evils of alcohol.79  As a result of these political pressures and 
 
PETER HERNON & TERRY GANEY, UNDER THE INFLUENCE: THE UNAUTHORIZED STORY OF THE 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH DYNASTY 397-398 (1991).  A law prohibiting the driver from drinking 
alcoholic beverages while operating a motor vehicle did not pass until 1991.  See MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 577.017 (1991).  As of the date of print of this article, the Missouri legislature still has not 
passed a law prohibiting car passengers from consuming alcoholic beverages while traveling in a 
moving car.  Eric Stern, Anheuser-Busch Says It Won’t Oppose a 0.08 Drunken-Driving 
Standard, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 17, 2001, at A1. 
 73. Morlock, supra note 71, at B1; J.S., 1st Reg. Sess., at 303 (Mo. 1985); S.B. 345, 83rd 
Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1985). 
 74. S.B. 345, 83rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1985) [hereinafter Senate Bill 345]. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Sen. Comm. Subst. S.B. 345, 83rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1985); J.S., 1st Reg. 
Sess., at 638 (Mo. 1985). 
 77. Sen. Comm. Subst. S.B. 345. 
 78. Id. 
 79. John M. McGuire, Ashcroft & Ashcroft: Missouri’s New Governor and His Wife, Janet, 
are Partners in Law and Life, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 6, 1985, at K9: 
Tolerant as he may be of differing views on faith and morals, Ashcroft nevertheless does 
not hide his zeal for a life without tobacco and alcohol.  When each of the three Ashcroft 
children were born, father John proudly accepted congratulations and passed out bubble-
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realities, Senator Panethiere introduced another version of Senate Bill 345, 
which generally eliminated dram shop liability as the committee version did, 
but provided for one exception.80  A third party would have a private right of 
action against a restaurant or tavern if that business “had been convicted of the 
sale of intoxicating liquor to a person under the age of twenty-one years or an 
obviously intoxicated person” under section 311.310 of the Revised Statutes of 
Missouri, and if the sale of the liquor was the “proximate cause” of those 
injuries.81  By allowing a private cause of action if the tavern or restaurant had 
received a criminal conviction, Panethiere’s new Senate Bill 345 gave those in 
the legislature and the Governor’s Mansion an opportunity to support the new 
bill and gain favor with the restaurant industry while “saving face” with their 
constituents.  The strategy appeared to have worked, for Ashcroft’s office, in 
later supporting the bill, issued a statement assuring the public that “liquor 
businesses can be found liable for injuries if the qualifications for filing suit are 
met.”82  This new version of Senate Bill 345 was approved by a majority of the 
Senate.83 
After passage of the new dram shop act in the Senate, the Missouri House 
of Representatives broadened the bill’s narrow liability exception slightly by 
 
gum cigars.  And at a reception in his campaign for attorney general, Ashcroft asked one 
aide why one punch bowl appeared to be disappearing faster than the other.  The popular 
bowl was the one with the bourbon added, he was told.  Ashcroft was not pleased. 
Id. 
 80. This version of the bill further declared that since the repeal of the Missouri Dram Shop 
Act in 1934, Missouri policy has been to follow the common law of England that furnishing 
alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons.  
Panethiere’s new version of the bill also specifically abrogated the holdings of the Carver v. 
Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 
S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), and Nesbitt v. Westport Square, Ltd., 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1980) cases in favor of the traditional common law proximate cause rule.  Both of these 
additional statements would remain in the final version of the bill.  See Sen. Subst. Sen. Comm. 
Subst. S.B. 345, 83rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1985); J.S., 1st Reg. Sess., at 820-23 
(Mo. 1985). 
 81. Sen. Subst. Sen. Comm. Subst. S.B. 345.  Legal commentators have noted the 
contradictory way in which the statute addresses the “proximate cause” issue: “Logically, the 
statute contradicts itself . . . . Basically, the statute declares that furnishing alcohol is not the 
proximate cause [of injuries inflicted by another intoxicated person], but that violation of the 
statute which prohibits furnishing may be the proximate cause.”  Stratmann, supra note 18, at 
290.  The majority in Kilmer saw this contradiction as an encroachment on the judiciary’s 
authority: “The statute does not define ‘proximate cause,’ which would be an appropriate 
legislative function, but rather finds that it does not exist in certain cases, which seems to be 
distinctly a judicial function.”  Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 551 n.19. 
 82. Dvorak, supra note 71, at B1. 
 83. J.S., 1st Reg. Sess., at 892 (Mo. 1985).  Though explicitly eliminated in the first Senate 
version of the bill, one could also argue that this new version of the bill also allowed the 
intoxicated patron, injured by his own intoxication, to file suit against a tavern or restaurant.  See 
Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 553 n.22. 
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adding a provision to the bill which would allow a third party to bring a suit 
against the dram shop if the dram shop had “received a suspended imposition 
of the sentence arising from the conviction.”84  The Missouri House passed the 
bill with this addition,85 and a few days later the Senate passed the dram shop 
bill with the House’s amendment.86  When Governor Ashcroft affixed his 
signature to the much-amended Senate Bill 345, the elimination of dram shop 
liability, except in the limited case where a criminal conviction of the 
restaurant or tavern had occurred, became the law of the state of Missouri.87  
The holdings of Sampson, Nesbitt and Carver had been erased. 
Missouri’s new Dram Shop Liability Act, codified as section 537.053 of 
the Revised Statutes of Missouri, placed the state in a new and unique minority 
position on the dram shop issue.  Even today, only a few states have no dram 
shop liability whatsoever.88  While Missouri remained in the majority of states 
that had some sort of dram shop liability,89 it was just barely a member of that 
majority.  With the passage of the Dram Shop Liability Act in 1985, Missouri 
became the only state in the Union to enact a law requiring a criminal 
conviction of a tavern before civil dram shop liability would arise, all at a time 
when public outcries over the horrors of drunk driving could not have been 
greater and at a time when the teetotaler Governor had forbidden the service of 
alcoholic beverages at the Governor’s mansion.90 
III. A PREVIEW OF THE ISSUES IN KILMER—SIMPSON V. KILCHER 
Before the Missouri Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 
new dram shop liability statute in Kilmer, the state’s high court first tackled the 
constitutional viability of section 537.053 in a 1988 case, Simpson v. Kilcher.91  
The main legal issues that the Kilmer court would address, such as challenges 
to the statute based upon the open courts provision in the Missouri constitution 
and upon separation of powers, as well as the issues of how to deal with the 
 
 84. J.H., 1st Reg. Sess., at 1386-87 (Mo. 1985). 
 85. Id. at 1387-88. 
 86. J.S., 1st Reg. Sess., at 1210-12 (Mo. 1985). 
 87. The new dram shop statute was later codified as section 537.053 of the Revised Statutes 
of Missouri.  See complete text of statute supra note 13. 
 88. See Smith, supra note 41, at 557 n.33.  These states include Kansas and Maryland.  Id. 
 89. See id. at 556. 
 90. Id. at 574.  Such was the power of the restaurant lobby, and presumably the alcoholic 
beverage and distribution lobby, in Missouri.  In response to MADD’s charge that less restrictions 
on taverns and restaurants would result in more drunken drivers, Senator Panethiere, the sponsor 
of the new dram shop statute, responded, “[i]f you close all the bars and taverns, you still are 
going to have drunken drivers . . . .  These people are not mad mothers.  They are prohibitionists.”  
Morlock, supra note 71, at B1. 
 91. 749 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. 1988). 
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statute if parts of it were unconstitutional, first rose to the surface of Missouri’s 
legal waters in Simpson.92 
On the early morning of October 6, 1985, not quite four months after the 
passage of section 537.053, Walter Kilcher drove his car out of a bar parking 
lot, across three lanes of highway and over a concrete median, striking 
motorcyclist Richard Simpson.93  The liquoring-up culprits in this case were 
establishments known as the Water Wheel Lounge and The King of Clubs.94  
Simpson filed suit against the driver and the owners of the taverns for his 
injuries.95  The owners of the taverns did not receive criminal convictions 
under section 311.310, and thus Simpson did not have a cause of action under 
section 537.053.96  Nonetheless, Simpson filed his lawsuit, challenging the 
constitutionality of Missouri’s new dram shop statute, and in particular, the 
provision requiring a criminal conviction of the dram shop.97 
Simpson argued that section 537.053 violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Missouri and United States Constitutions, violated the 
open courts provision in article I, section 14, of the Missouri Constitution, and 
violated the separation of powers provision in article II, section 1, of the 
Missouri Constitution.98  The Missouri Supreme Court rejected all of these 
arguments.99 
The majority opinion in Simpson, authored by Justice Higgins and joined 
by Justices Blackmar, Donnelly, Welliver and Robertson, found that section 
537.053 did not violate the open courts provision as outlined in the Missouri 
Constitution.  The Missouri Constitution’s open courts provision provides that 
“the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy 
afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and 
justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”100  The majority 
held that this provision did not create rights, but only allowed an individual 
“claiming . . . rights access to the courts when such a person has a legitimate 
claim recognized by law.”101  Simpson was not denied access to the courts, the 
majority stated, because the plaintiff did not have a right recognized under the 
 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. at 388. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 388-89. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 389. 
 99. Id.  Because the Kilmer decision only addressed the open courts and separation of 
powers challenges, only those two challenges in the Simpson decision will be discussed 
extensively in this Note.  The due process and equal protection challenges failed because the 
majority found that the statute held a “rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.”  Id. at 
392-93. 
 100. MO. CONST. art. I, § 14. 
 101. Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 389. 
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new section 537.053.  The criminal conviction requirement, according to the 
majority, did not constitute a “precondition to access to the courts” and thus an 
“obstruction or bar to his right to sue,” but was instead “a condition to the 
existence of a cause of action,” or more simply, an “element of plaintiff’s right 
to sue.”102  Thus, Simpson’s open courts argument failed. 
The plaintiff in Simpson also argued that section 537.053 violated 
Missouri’s non-delegation doctrine and separation of powers doctrine.103  
Simpson’s family argued that the criminal conviction requirement violated the 
non-delegation doctrine because the requirement delegated discretionary 
authority over whether a cause of action existed to the executive branch; the 
court rejected this argument as a “strained construction.”104  Simpson also 
argued that section 537.053.2 violated separation of powers because it 
attempted  “retroactive abrogation of existing judicial decisions mentioned in 
the statute.”105  The majority relied on case law and found that section 537.053 
was “prospective in nature” and did not require retroactive application.106  
Because the statute did not attempt retroactive abrogation of judicial rulings, 
the majority rejected Simpson’s separation of powers challenge.107 
If the majority had found either part of section 537.053 unconstitutional as 
Simpson had argued, the interesting question of how the court should have 
dealt with those constitutional problems would have arisen.  Section 1.140 of 
the Revised Statutes of Missouri, the severability statute, provides as follows: 
The provisions of every statute are severable.  If any provision of a statute is 
found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the 
remaining provisions of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid 
provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and 
so dependant upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the 
legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or 
unless the court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete 
and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative 
intent.108 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 390. 
 104. Id. at 390-91.  The majority in Kilmer would later choose not to analyze section 537.053 
explicitly within the confines of the non-delegation doctrine.  For a discussion of how Missouri 
has developed a liberal view of the non-delegation doctrine which allows broad grants of 
authority from the legislature to various agencies, see Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A 
Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 588-98 (1994). 
 105. Id.  As mentioned earlier, section 537.053.2 specifically abrogated the holdings of 
Carver, Sampson and Nesbitt by name. 
 106. Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 391-92. 
 107. Id. 
 108. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.140 (1957). 
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Had the court found that section 537.053 violated the open courts or separation 
of powers provisions of the Missouri Constitution, the majority wrote, the 
severability issue would not have even arisen, for those arguments did not 
focus on one part of the statute but instead “focus[ed] on the entire statute.”109  
Essentially, the majority found that the criminal conviction requirement was so 
intertwined with the purpose of the statute—to eliminate dram shop liability 
except for in this limited criminal conviction situation—the criminal 
conviction requirement could not have been removed without striking the 
entire statute. 
In the dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Billings, joined by Justice Rendlen, 
wrote that section 537.053 did in fact violate the open courts provision in the 
Missouri Constitution.110  The dissent offered a different test for determining 
whether or not a statute violated the open courts provision.  Any legislative 
alteration of a common law right, according to the dissent, is invalid if the 
alteration is arbitrary or unreasonable and if the alteration does not provide for 
an “adequate alternative course of action.”111  The alteration could still be 
valid, however, “if the legislature showed an overpowering public necessity for 
the abolition or restriction and no alternative method of meeting such public 
necessity.”112  Applying this test, the dissent held that section 537.053 violated 
the open courts provision because: (1) it altered a common law right as 
established in Carver; (2) it provided an unreasonable and inadequate 
alternative because such alternative turned on the discretion of the local 
prosecuting attorney over whether to prosecute a tavern; and (3) the Court 
found that the legislature failed to provide any “overpowering public 
necessity” for the alteration.113 
The dissent also agreed that section 537.053 violated separation of powers, 
laying the basis for an argument the majority in Kilmer would later adopt in 
part.114  Under section 537.053, whether one had a cause of action against a 
tavern depended on whether a criminal conviction had been secured against 
that tavern.  The dissent argued that the requirement of a criminal conviction 
was, in effect, a “delega[tion of] authority to the executive.”115  Since the local 
prosecuting attorney, a member of the executive branch, had the discretion to 
decide whether to pursue a criminal action against the tavern and because the 
criminal conviction was tied to whether a cause of action existed against the 
 
 109. Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 393. 
 110. Id. at 395 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. (citing Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 12 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)). 
 112. Id. (citing Smith v. Dep’t. of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088 (Fla. 1987)). 
 113. Id. at 395-96.  The majority in Kilmer decided not to address whether or not the abolition 
of a common law or statutory cause of action was subject to scrutiny under the open courts 
provision of the Missouri Constitution.  Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 552 n.20. 
 114. Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 396 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. 
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tavern, the dissent reasoned that the prosecutor had the discretion of 
determining whether an individual had a cause of action against the tavern.116  
Deciding whether a civil action existed, the dissent argued, was power reserved 
to the legislature or to the judiciary, but not to the executive.117  Thus, the 
criminal conviction requirement of section 537.053 violated the separation of 
powers provision in the Missouri Constitution.118 
Finding the criminal conviction requirement in subsection 3 of section 
537.053 unconstitutional, the dissent then attempted to address how this 
unconstitutionality should be handled.  As stated in the majority opinion, 
whether or not a statutory provision may be severed depends upon the intent of 
the legislature.119  The dissent argued that all of subsection 3, the section 
granting a cause of action if a criminal conviction had been obtained, could not 
be severed from the statute because to do so would leave only sections 1 and 2, 
the sections which explicitly eliminated all dram shop liability.120  The 
legislature, the dissent argued, did not intend to “completely immunize” 
taverns and restaurants because to do so would have contradicted the 
legislature’s “concern about irresponsible behavior by sellers of liquor . . . .”121 
However, it remains unclear how the dissent would have actually handled 
this severance issue.  The dissent eventually argued that section 537.053 could 
not “withstand constitutional challenge” and that the plaintiffs should be 
allowed to pursue their cause of action.122  The dissent did not provide any 
specific details, however, of how the plaintiffs could have legally pursued their 
cause of action.  The dissent never said that it would only sever the criminal 
conviction language from subsection 3 of section 537.053, effectively creating 
a broad statute of liability for dram shops, or whether it would have found the 
entire dram shop liability unconstitutional and reverted back to the common 
law of Carver.  Justice Billings merely wrote that “I suggest that [the 
legislature’s] concern about irresponsible behavior by sellers of liquor would 
have led the legislature to leave the law as it was [under Carver] rather than 
grant complete immunity . . . .”123  The specifics as to how this idea would 
 
 116. The dissent argued that the criminal conviction requirement was substantive in nature, 
yet still violated the separation of powers “in effect.”  Id.  The dissent’s view presents one of the 
few instances in which an opinion, albeit here a dissenting opinion, has found a substantive 
statutory requirement to fail under a separation of powers or open courts challenge.  See 
discussion infra Parts IV.B.1.b and IV.B.2.b. 
 117. Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 396 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 397. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 397 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. 
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translate into an actual holding would have to wait twelve years for Justice 
Wolff’s opinion in Kilmer. 
IV. KILMER V. MUN—EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S 
REASONING 
By the time the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the Dram Shop 
Liability Act in the Kilmer case, none of the original justices sitting on the 
bench during the Simpson decision remained on the court.  The widow and 
children of Thomas Kilmer brought their case to the court with arguments 
similar to those raised by Richard Simpson and his family twelve years 
before.124  For Thomas Kilmer’s family, the change in time and justices made 
all the difference in the world. 
A. The Dissenting Opinion in Kilmer—Simpson Revisited: Explanation and 
Analysis125 
Justice Limbaugh, joined by Justices Covington and Benton, delivered the 
dissenting opinion in Kilmer, embracing the arguments made twelve years 
earlier in the Simpson majority opinion and criticizing the Kilmer majority for 
not “giving Simpson the courtesy of addressing its compelling rationale.”126  In 
dismissing the plaintiffs’ open courts challenge, the dissent in Kilmer reiterated 
the majority’s opinion in Simpson that the criminal conviction requirement was 
an element of the substantive law, not a procedural precondition to a cause of 
action.127  The dissent also rejected the argument that the statute violated 
separation of powers, finding that the local prosecuting attorney was not 
exercising any discretion over plaintiffs’ possible causes of action but was 
instead simply fulfilling his statutory duty to file charges against individuals 
for violating the criminal laws of the state.128  Finally, the dissent proposed that 
even if subsection 3 of section 537.053 was unconstitutional, it would sever 
 
 124. See discussion of facts of Kilmer supra Part I. 
 125. Although it is rather unconventional for a case note to begin its analysis of the principal 
case by focusing on the dissenting opinion, the similarities and differences between the Simpson 
and Kilmer cases seem to dictate such an atypical organization in order to present the main issues 
addressed more clearly and succinctly.  Discussing the dissenting opinion in Kilmer, which 
largely adopts the majority opinion in Simpson, after discussing the majority opinion’s fascinating 
analysis in Kilmer, would also seem somewhat anticlimactic. 
 126. “The majority misapplies the open courts provision to afford plaintiffs a cause of action 
for dram shop liability that the statute does not permit, and in the process overrules Simpson v. 
Kilcher. . . without giving Simpson the courtesy of addressing its compelling rationale, much less 
paying any consideration to the principles of stare decisis.”  Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 554 
(Limbaugh, J., dissenting). 
 127. The dissenting justices failed to provide any rationale as to why the criminal conviction 
requirement was substantive, rather than procedural.  See id. at 555 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting) and 
Part IV.B.1.b infra. 
 128. Id. at 556 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). 
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subsection 3 entirely, not just the criminal conviction language.129  To sever 
only the criminal conviction requirement, the dissent argued, would create full 
dram shop liability.130  This result would completely conflict with the 
“legislative intent, or rather the legislative mandate” that no dram shop liability 
exist except in the criminal conviction situation.131  The dissent, however, fell 
one vote short of continuing the Simpson line of reasoning in Kilmer. 
B. The Majority Opinion 
1. The Open Courts Provision in the Missouri Constitution 
a. Explanation 
The majority opinion in Kilmer, authored by Justice Wolff and joined by 
Justices Price, White and Holstein, focused on two of the issues that dominated 
the Simpson decision, namely an open courts provision challenge and a 
separation of powers challenge to section 537.053.132  In discussing the open 
courts challenge to the dram shop liability act, the majority acknowledged a 
criticism, waged by legal commentators, that Missouri courts had produced an 
inconsistent, and often “irreconcilable” jurisprudence regarding its open courts 
doctrine.133  Though past cases may have enunciated different standards, the 
Kilmer majority adopted the dissent’s argument from Wheeler v. Briggs134 that 
the open courts provision in the Missouri Constitution “‘prohibits any law that 
arbitrarily or unreasonably bars individuals or classes of individuals from 
accessing our courts in order to enforce recognized causes of action for 
personal injury.’”135  Moreover, the majority argued that while the legislature 
could modify or even abolish common law or statutory claims, where the law 
still recognized a cause of action, a meaningful right to a “certain remedy” 
 
 129. Id. at 557. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See generally Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 547-53. 
 133. See id. at 548-49 nn.13-14; see also Martin M. Loring, Constitutional Law: Statutorily 
Required Mediation as a Precondition to Lawsuit Denies Access to the Courts, 45 MO. L. REV. 
316, 319 n.25 (1980).  “The Missouri Supreme Court has not enunciated any consistent rules of 
law in its interpretation of MO. CONST. art I, § 14, although a variety of fact situations have been 
found to deny or not to deny access to the courts.”  Id. 
 134. 941 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 135. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 549 (quoting Wheeler, 941 S.W.2d at 515 (alteration in original)). 
Despite the inconsistencies [in the open courts provision cases], there is a coherent line of 
reasoning that can be distilled from various opinions over the years that, if followed in 
this and subsequent cases, will ensure that article I, section 14 retains its vitality while 
permitting proper deference to legislative enactments. 
Id. 
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must remain.136  With these principles in mind, the majority developed a “new” 
test for determining if a legislative act violates the open courts provision in the 
Missouri Constitution: such a legislative act would violate the open courts 
provision if it “erected” an “arbitrary or unreasonable barrier” before those 
individuals “seeking a remedy for a recognized injury.”137 
In applying its “new” open courts test, the majority held that subsection 3 
of Missouri’s dram shop liability statute violated the open courts provision as 
set forth in the Missouri Constitution.138  The majority found that the statute 
recognized a legal injury, because subsection 3 recognized “causes of 
action . . . by or on behalf of any person who has suffered personal injury or 
death against any person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor by the drink for 
consumption on the premises. . . [to] an obviously intoxicated person.”139  The 
injured party, however, could only assert an action for a proper remedy, i.e., 
money damages, where the person licensed to sell alcoholic beverages had 
been convicted under section 311.310.140 
The majority found that the criminal conviction requirement constituted an 
“arbitrary, unreasonable barrier.”141  The court wrote that an injured party’s 
cause of action was subject to two different barriers: (1) a decision by the local 
prosecutor to file a criminal action under section 311.310, and (2) a conviction 
of the seller under section 311.310.142  Only if both of these requirements were 
met could an injured party pursue a remedy.143  The majority held that these 
two requirements were “arbitrary and unreasonable” for two general reasons. 
The first reason for arbitrariness and unreasonableness arose from the 
reality that whether a person had a cause of action “depend[ed] entirely upon 
the decision of the elected county prosecuting attorney.”144  Such decisions by 
the prosecutor over whether to prosecute could become “vulnerable to 
inevitable pressures of local politics or other factors unrelated to the merits, yet 
[remain] wholly immune from review.”145  The second factor showing 
arbitrariness and unreasonableness was the inability to bring lawsuits against 
out-of-state restaurants and bars under the dram shop liability statute.  Under 
 
 136. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 550.  This statement seems quite different, as least theoretically, 
than the dissent’s view in Simpson, where the dissent argued that the legislature, in amending the 
common law, had to keep an “adequate alternative” unless the legislature could demonstrate an 
“overpowering public necessity” for the alternation.  See Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 395 (Billings, 
J., dissenting). 
 137. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 550. 
 138. Id. at 545. 
 139. Id. at 550 (quoting section 537.053.3). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 551. 
 143. Id. at 551-52. 
 144. Id. at 552. 
 145. Id. 
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section 311.310, a criminal conviction could only be obtained against a 
Missouri alcohol licensee.  If an individual had been injured by an intoxicated 
person who had patronized an out-of-state tavern, such as in Illinois, that 
tavern would escape liability because the dram shop liability statute required a 
criminal conviction under section 311.310.146  For both of these reasons, the 
majority held that the criminal conviction requirement of subsection 3 of 
section 537.053 was “arbitrary and unreasonable” and violated the open courts 
provision in the Missouri Constitution.147 
b. Analysis 
While the majority in Kilmer purported to develop a new test to determine 
whether or not a statute violated the open courts provision in the Missouri 
Constitution, the court simply continued to do what legal commentators have 
suggested past Missouri courts have done with their open courts decisions: 
essentially using new legal terms in a “descriptive fashion,” rather than to 
“delineate any precise standards of analysis.”148 
A number of Missouri open courts cases, such as Kilmer, have applied 
open courts constitutional scrutiny to statutes that granted a party a civil cause 
of action, but made that action subject to some sort of requirement that had to 
be fulfilled before a party could pursue the cause of action.149  In fact, a review 
 
 146. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 552. 
 147. Id. at 553. 
 148. Loring, supra note 133, at 319 n.25. 
 149. See generally State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 
107, 110 (Mo. 1979) (requiring medical malpractice claims be submitted to review board before 
filing a cause of action); Schumer v. Perryville, 667 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. 1984) (requiring that 
individuals, including children, had to provide a city of the fourth class ninety days notice before 
filing a cause of action); Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 9-12 (Mo. 1986) (requiring 
that injured parties, including children over the age of ten, had to file a medical malpractice suit 
within two years of the alleged injury); Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Serv., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 
503, 509-10 (Mo. 1991) (requiring, in a medical malpractice action, the filing of an affidavit after 
the filing of a cause of action from a health care expert stating the doctor’s negligence); Blaske v. 
Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 832-33 (Mo. 1991) (requiring that all causes of action 
against builders or designers of real property be brought within ten years after the improvement 
on the real property); Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 9-10 (Mo. 1992) 
(requiring that all causes of action possibly covered by Missouri Workers’ Compensation law be 
submitted before a Professional Liability Review Board); Wheeler v. Briggs, 941 S.W.2d 512, 
514-15 (Mo. 1997) (requiring that mentally incapacitated persons could not bring a medical 
malpractice action until their “disability is removed”).  Though somewhat different from 
legislative enactments which require the occurrence of some action before a cause of action may 
be brought, it is noteworthy that the Missouri Supreme Court has consistently upheld legislative 
enactments, at least under open courts constitutional challenges, which granted immunity to 
certain types of parties or provided limits on damages for various traditional common law causes 
of actions. See Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Mo. 1989) (granting 
immunity from negligence actions for not-for-profit health corporations); Adams v. Children’s 
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of these decisions on the open courts issue indicates that while the courts 
employ different tests to analyze the various pre-civil action requirements, the 
plain reality of these decisions demonstrates that Missouri courts have 
routinely scrutinized these statutes by a far simpler standard.  Moreover, the 
constitutionality of these statutes has turned essentially on whether the court 
believes that the pre-cause of action requirement is a procedural impediment to 
the civil action, or whether it is an essential part, or element, of the substantive 
law itself. 
Of the cases in which the court found a statutory provision in violation of 
the open courts provision, all the decisions, either explicitly or by clear 
implication, have found the statutory requirements to be procedural, rather than 
substantive.  In State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital v. 
Gaertner,150 the court found that requiring a party with a medical malpractice 
claim to send his or her case to a review board before filing suit violated the 
open courts provision, because the review board requirement caused a “useless 
and arbitrary delay.”151  The court in Gaertner held that the review board 
requirement “abridg[ed] the right to file suit,” implicitly indicating that the 
review board requirement was a procedure which served to prevent a person 
from pursuing their rights, not an actual component of the right to file suit.152  
If an individual cannot prove one of the substantive elements of the cause of 
action, that missing element does not serve to prevent one from pursuing a 
right, but demonstrates that the person has no right to pursue.  The court used 
more explicit language in indicating that a pre-cause of action requirement was 
procedural in the Schumer v. Perryville153 and Strahler v. St. Luke’s 
Hospital,154 cases.  Once classifying each of these requirements as procedural, 
the court could then continue with an analysis as to why each requirement was 
unreasonable, unnecessary, or arbitrary. 
On the other hand, in each case where the court labeled the pre-civil action 
requirement as substantive, or part of the right sued upon or an element of the 
cause of action, the court has ruled that an open courts violation has not 
 
Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 905-06 (Mo. 1992) (limiting the amount of damages a party could 
receive in a medical malpractice action). 
 150. 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979). 
 151. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d at 110. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Schumer, 667 S.W.2d at 417.  “To require such an impossibility of her would, in effect, 
be a denial of her right to sue at all upon a perfectly valid cause of action.”  Id. (citing Randolph 
v. City of Springfield, 257 S.W. 449, 451 (Mo. 1923) (alteration in original)). 
 154. Strahler, 706 S.W.2d at 12.  “To the extent that it deprives minor medical malpractice 
claimants the right to assert their claims individually. . . the provisions of § 516.105 are too 
severe an interference with a minors’ state constitutionally enumerated right of access to the 
courts.”  Id. 
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occurred.155  For example, in Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc.,156 the court 
found that a difference in the statute of limitations on suits against builders and 
developers did not violate the open courts provision because Missouri case law 
did not demonstrate that the open courts provision limited the “legislature’s 
authority to design the framework of the substantive law.”157  A requirement 
that the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, rather than a circuit court, 
must determine whether an incident was an “accident” in a workers 
compensation situation did not violate the open courts provision, the court said 
in Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,158 because the requirement was 
simply part of the “framework for the substantive law.”159 
In Wheeler v. Briggs,160 the court held that a statute that did not allow 
“mentally incapacitated persons” to bring a medical malpractice action until 
they no longer had such a disability failed to violate the open courts provision 
because mentally incapacitated persons “have the right to pursue in the courts 
any cause of action the substantive law recognizes.”161  The court further 
argued that it was “their own disability that prevents, as a practical matter, 
meaningful access to the courts.”162  The requirement upheld in Wheeler was 
part of the substantive law, not a procedural impediment.  Once a pre-cause of 
action requirement receives a “substantive” label, the court has not found it in 
violation of the open courts provision. 
In these cases, the process by which the court determines whether a 
requirement is procedural or substantive, although crucial to the final outcome 
of the case, received little attention.  Because most of these pre-cause of action 
requirements have both procedural and substantive aspects, one could 
rationally construe most of them as either procedural or substantive.  In fact, 
one may accurately say that the legislature, with these requirements, sought to 
fulfill substantive law objectives through procedural means.  For example, 
requiring a plaintiff to submit the question of whether an incident in a workers 
compensation setting was an “accident” to a labor relations board can be 
 
 155. The Missouri Supreme Court in Mahoney found that a statute’s requirement of a filing of 
a medical expert affidavit after the plaintiff filed suit was found to be substantive in nature, a 
“redesign” of the “framework of substantive law,” and was also found not to violate the open 
courts provision.  Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 510 (quoting Harrel v. Total Health Care Inc., 781 
S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo. 1989)).  However, one can also distinguish this case from all of the others 
discussed in this section because the requirement of an affidavit was not a pre-cause of action 
requirement, for it only required the affidavit to be filed after the suit was filed.  Mahoney, 807 
S.W.2d at 510. 
 156. 821 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1991). 
 157. Id. at 833. 
 158. 824 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1992). 
 159. Id. at 10. 
 160. 941 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1997). 
 161. Id. at 515. 
 162. Id. 
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considered procedural; showing that an incident was not an “accident” can be 
considered another step before a plaintiff may pursue an intentional tort action 
in court.  On the other hand, the requirement could serve as part of the 
substantive law as well, because such decisions by the labor relations board 
serve to limit the types of incidents which escape coverage under the workers 
compensation umbrella. 
While Kilmer purports to create a “new” test for analyzing open courts 
provision challenges to statutes, in reality, the case merely repeats the 
traditional procedural-versus-substantive-law test.  Though the majority 
describes the criminal conviction requirement as “arbitrary” and 
“unreasonable,” the main hurdle that the court had to jump was determining 
that the criminal conviction requirement was a “barrier” to a lawsuit based on 
the injury recognized in section 537.053, not an element of the lawsuit itself.163  
As mentioned earlier, the court in Simpson held that the criminal conviction 
requirement was not an “obstruction or bar to [the] right to sue,” but was 
instead an “element of plaintiff’s right to sue.”164  Herein lies the main 
difference between the court’s decision in Simpson and that in Kilmer: the 
Simpson court found the criminal conviction provision of section 537.053 
substantive; the Kilmer court found the requirement procedural.  Substantive 
law cannot violate the open courts provision, but procedural impediments can.  
Though Kilmer suggests that it employs a new test for open courts challenges, 
the threshold issue upon which the open courts decision turns is whether the 
court finds a pre-cause of action requirement to be procedural or substantive. 
Without any clear rules or methods of analysis for distinguishing between 
procedural and substantive law in open courts cases, making such a distinction 
could easily, and probably often does, turn on the various judges’ views as to 
the proper development of the law, views which may or may not coincide with 
what the legislature views as the proper development of the law.  As Kilmer 
and past case law demonstrate, the extraordinarily vague standards for 
differentiating between procedural and substantive law provides fertile ground 
for the judges’ personal views as to the proper development of the law to factor 
into the open courts doctrine.165 
 
 163. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 552 n.20. 
 164. Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 389.  See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
 165. When discussing whether the criminal conviction requirement was a condition precedent 
to a cause of action (i.e. a procedural requirement) or whether it was an element of the cause of 
action (i.e. a substantive requirement) during the oral argument in Kilmer, one Missouri Supreme 
Court justice admitted, “I don’t understand the difference, necessarily.”  Audio file: Oral 
Argument, Kilmer (No. SC81853, January 4, 2000), at http://www.missourinet.com/supreme 
court/archive.asp?category=6&title=kilmer. 
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2. Separation of Powers 
a. Explanation 
After holding the dram shop liability statute in violation of the open courts 
provision in the Missouri Constitution, the majority addressed whether the 
statute violated separation of powers.166  Similar to the dissent in Simpson, the 
majority in Kilmer held that the criminal conviction requirement of section 
537.053.3 violated separation of powers because a “prosecuting attorney, and 
not the legislative branch” or the “court as a matter of common law” decided 
whether or not a cause of action exists under section 537.053.3.167  The 
majority clearly found that the criminal conviction requirement created a 
“dependency on the executive branch” in an area where the executive branch 
should have no role.168  To illustrate its point, the majority asked a series of 
hypothetical questions, such as whether a statute could permit the “state 
supervisor of liquor” to decide which cases were serious enough to warrant a 
cause of action, or could permit the “tavern operator’s state senator” to make 
such decisions.169  Any of these possibilities, the majority argued, “invites 
arbitrary refusals of the right to pursue a claim.”170 With its rationale made 
abundantly clear, the majority held that section 537.053 violated separation of 
powers.171 
b. Analysis 
In Simpson, the dissent discussed the issue of an open courts violation and 
the issue of a separation of powers violation as two separate and distinct 
constitutional challenges to section 537.053.3.172  In Kilmer, it is not altogether 
clear if the majority found section 537.053.3 unconstitutional because the 
criminal conviction requirement failed on both an open courts and separation 
of powers challenge, or because the majority found the separation of powers 
violation here as an example of the statute being “arbitrary and unreasonable” 
and therefore in violation of the open courts provision.  Such a distinction, 
however, seems to make little difference to the court’s holding. 
The significance of the majority’s separation of powers discussion lies in 
the disgust that it shows, through its series of hypothetical questions, for the 
way that the statute takes powers that should belong to the judiciary or the 
 
 166. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 552-53. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 553. 
 169. Id. at 553 (“After all, if this function can be delegated to officials of the executive 
branch, why not to members of the legislative branch?”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Kilmer, at 552-53. 
 172. Simpson, 749 S.W.2d at 395. 
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legislature and gives it to the executive branch.  This disgust, at least in part, 
helps to explain the majority’s decision on two crucial issues in this case,173 
namely whether the criminal conviction requirement is procedural or 
substantive174 and how the court interprets the legislature’s intent under the 
statute.175 
3. Severance of the Unconstitutional Criminal Conviction Requirement 
a. Explanation 
After declaring the criminal conviction requirement unconstitutional, the 
majority began its analysis of how to treat this constitutionally offensive 
statutory provision.  As mentioned earlier, Missouri, by statute, allows courts 
to sever unconstitutional statutory provisions unless the court determines that 
the “legislature would not have enacted the valid provisions without the void 
one.”176  The court clearly found subsection 3, the subsection requiring a 
criminal conviction, unconstitutional.  However, the majority wrote that the 
“only constitutionally offensive part of section 537.053.3 is that part requiring 
a criminal prosecution and conviction.”177  Therefore, only the criminal 
conviction requirement should be removed, the majority argued, leaving 
subsection 3 to read as follows: 
Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2 of this section, a cause of action may be 
brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered personal injury or 
death against any person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor by the drink for 
consumption on the premises . . . if the sale of such intoxicating liquor is the 
proximate cause of the personal injury or death sustained by such person.178 
The effect of such a severance, according to the majority, alters subsection 3 
from an exception to a denial of a cause of action, to a grant of a general cause 
of action.  However, the majority found that severing the conviction 
requirement would be more proper than completely severing subsection 3 from 
the statute.  Removing subsection 3 from section 537.053 in its entirety would 
have left only subsections 1 and 2, the subsections that eliminated dram shop 
liability.179  In order to remove subsection 3, the majority reasoned, the court 
 
 173. For a discussion of the court’s displeasure with this encroachment upon judicial 
autonomy, see infra Part V. 
 174. For a discussion of how the vague distinction between procedural and substantive 
requirements can affect the open courts doctrine, see supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 175. For a discussion of the majority’s curious interpretation of the legislature’s intent, see 
infra Part IV.B.3-4. 
 176. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 553. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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would have to find that the “legislature intended no dram shop liability.”180  
The majority, however, argued that the legislature “did enact dram shop 
liability [in subsection 3 of section 537.053], so it would be wrong for [the 
Court] to assume the legislature intended otherwise.”181  Therefore, the 
majority decided to remove only the criminal conviction language from 
subsection 3. 
b. Analysis 
From a logical standpoint, one can only understand the majority’s analysis 
on the severance issue by considering this Note’s earlier discussion of the 
distinction between procedural and substantive law with open courts cases.182  
The majority could only argue that subsection 3 created dram shop liability if it 
saw the criminal conviction requirement as a procedural impediment to the 
substantive law civil cause of action, rather than an element of the cause of 
action.  If the criminal conviction requirement was only a procedural barrier, 
then subsection 3, when read in isolation from subsections 1 and 2, could be 
read as creating dram shop liability.  If subsection 3 was read to create dram 
shop liability, removing it from the statute would seem to conflict with the 
legislature’s intent.  Only with such a highly technical reading could the 
majority, as the dissent pointed out, move beyond the plain intent of the 
legislature to provide only a limited exception for dram shop liability, rather 
than create full dram shop liability.183 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 553-54. 
 182. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 183. The legislative intent in section 537.053 appears fairly clear.  The legislature wanted to 
eliminate civil dram shop liability except in cases so egregious that a criminal conviction was 
warranted.  Under the severability statute, if a court finds a portion of a statute unconstitutional, 
then the remaining portions are valid unless the court finds that the “valid provisions, standing 
alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative 
intent.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 1.140.  Since the majority in Kilmer found the criminal conviction 
requirement unconstitutional, no workable severance of the statute would have complied with the 
legislative intent.  Severing all of subsection 3 would have completely eliminated all dram shop 
liability, which was not the legislative intent.  Eliminating only the criminal conviction 
requirement, at least in the majority’s view, allowed full-fledged dram shop liability—which was 
certainly not the legislature’s intent.  Because any severance of section 537.053 would have 
violated the legislature’s intent, the court should have declared the entire statute unconstitutional.  
Since section 537.053.2 specifically abrogated the Carver holding which had allowed dram shop 
liability, declaring the entire statute unconstitutional would have eliminated this statutory 
abrogation and would have arguably restored the Carver court’s common law decision.  Thus, if 
the court would have declared the entire statute unconstitutional, the court would have 
accomplished the effect of restoring dram shop liability and would have issued an opinion 
consistent with and in respect of the legislature’s intent. 
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4. A Statute That Eliminates and Creates Dram Shop Liability 
a. Explanation 
After the majority explained its rationale for severing the criminal 
conviction requirement from subsection 3, the majority held that the Kilmers 
could pursue their cause of action.184  In doing so, the majority failed to 
address the existence of subsections 1 and 2 of section 537.053, for the 
majority never expressly severed them from the statute as it did with the 
criminal conviction requirement.185  Subsections 1 and 2 of section 537.053 
expressly eliminate dram shop liability.186  Subsection 3, after the majority’s 
severance, now expressly creates dram shop liability.187  The apparent effect of 
the majority’s severance is that section 537.053 is a statute with an identity 
crisis—it both eliminates and creates dram shop liability at the same time. 
b. Analysis 
The majority seemingly treated subsections 1 and 2 as irrelevant.  In the 
course of its open courts provision discussion, the majority wrote that the 
“legislature purports to eliminate dram shop liability in sections 537.053.1 and 
537.053.2, but in actuality it does not.”188  The majority provided an analysis 
as to why both subsections 1 and 2 failed to eliminate dram shop liability, even 
though the legislature thought these subsections would suffice.189 
Subsection 1 of 537.053 declared that “[i]t has been and continues to be 
the policy of this state to follow the common law of England, as declared in 
section 1.010, RSMo, to prohibit dram shop liability and to follow the common 
law” proximate cause rule.190  The majority noted that section 1.010 of the 
Revised Statutes of Missouri only includes English common law as it existed 
in the fourth year of the reign of James the First: the year 1607.191  The 
concepts of “proximate cause,” or even negligence for that matter, did not 
evolve until the 19th century.  Though subsection 1 attempts to enunciate the 
policy of Missouri on dram shop liability, the majority pointed to the 
subsection’s historical inaccuracy. 
 
 184. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 554. 
 185. The dissent in Kilmer seems to make this same interpretive leap as well, writing that the 
“effect of severing the limitation on the cause of action for dram shop liability is to convert the 
cause of action to one with essentially the same elements as the court-made action that first 
appeared in the early 1980s and that the legislature now expressly disallows.”  Id. at 557. 
 186. See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.053.1-.2 (1990). 
 187. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 553-54. 
 188. Id. at 551. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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Subsection 2 of section 537.053 abrogated the holdings in cases such as 
Carver, Sampson and Nesbitt, in “favor of prior judicial interpretation” which 
endorsed the “proximate cause” rule.192  The majority argued this statement 
was false as well, citing the Skinner case as an example that the “proximate 
cause” rule had never been endorsed in Missouri.193 
The majority’s analysis that the statute was wrong on its history is 
seriously misleading.  As alluded to earlier, Skinner did not reject the 
traditional common law “proximate cause” rule.194  Skinner is first and 
foremost a slavery case; all apparent holdings relating to damage resulting 
from alcohol consumption is secondary.195  Though Mrs. Hughes suffered the 
legal injury, the actual physical injury occurred not to a third party, but to the 
patron himself.  After consuming his quart of whiskey, Willis did not fire up 
Mrs. Hughes’s horse and buggy and crash it into the side of her Platte County 
home; instead, he, by all estimation, suffered terribly from alcohol poisoning.  
Moreover, as the Missouri Supreme Court correctly noted in Andres v. Alpha 
Kappa Lambda Fraternity,196 the Skinner case did not focus on Willis’ injuries 
as a human being, but instead focused on his slave master’s “property loss.”197  
The court in Skinner did not abrogate the traditional common law “proximate 
cause” rule because the court treated the case as one of property, holding that 
one individual by his actions damaged another individual’s property.198  To 
argue that Skinner rejected the common law rule in Missouri simply ignores 
the historical context in which the opinion was written and the relatively 
limited holding that the opinion therefore produced.199 
Moreover, not until Prohibition did the legislature create dram shop 
liability, and such liability was part of a larger statutory scheme to prohibit all 
 
 192. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 551. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See discussion of facts supra Part II.A. 
 195. For an explanation of the court’s holding in Skinner, see discussion supra Part II.A. 
 196. 730 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1987). 
 197. Id. at 552 n.12. 
 198. In addition to the comparison of selling alcohol to the slave to placing “noxious food 
within the reach of domestic animals,” other details in the case also demonstrate that the court 
truly issued a property damage holding.  Skinner, 13 Mo. at 443.  One can look first to the trial 
court’s jury instructions, which the Missouri Supreme Court approved, which referred to the 
“negro boy, Willis” as the “property of plaintiff.”  Id. at 441, 444.  One can also look to the 
plaintiff’s measure of damages in this case ($900.00), which just happened to correspond with the 
slave’s “worth” on the open market ($900.00).  Id. at 441-42. 
 199. The court in Skinner does seem to discuss the idea of proximate cause in holding that the 
sale of whiskey to the slave was the “natural consequence” of the slave’s death.  Id. at 443.  
However, such a holding on causation should be limited to this unique slave-as-property damage 
situation. 
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sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages in the state.200  Alcohol was 
considered contraband, and dram shop liability was established to help remove 
this contraband from Missouri.  When Prohibition ended, the legislature 
specifically repealed dram shop liability.  Since alcohol was no longer 
contraband, a cause of action helping eliminate it was not necessary.  After the 
repeal of the dram shop statute, and with only the Skinner slavery case in the 
background, dram shop liability should have been presumed not to exist. 
In fact, it was nonexistent.  When the Missouri Court of Appeals discussed 
the liability of tavern and restaurant owners in Sampson and Nesbitt, they did 
not hold that dram shop liability existed based upon the common law.201  
Rather, the cases endorsed tavern liability on a negligence per se theory, 
piggybacking on the legislature’s criminal alcohol statute, section 311.310.  
Only when the Missouri Court of Appeals could not apply the negligence per 
se theory in Carver because the dram shop owners in question were licensed in 
Illinois and not in Missouri, did the court endorse a common law dram shop 
liability rule.  The Carver court did not cite any previous Missouri case law 
that recognized dram shop liability, and only decided to expand dram shop 
liability because it foresaw the possibility of injury: “Traveling by car to and 
from a tavern is commonplace in current times.”202  Dram shop liability 
developed in Missouri common law courts in the 1980s; otherwise, it did not 
exist after, or even before, the 1919 Prohibition-style dram shop act. 
The legislature was incorrect in stating that “proximate cause” existed in 
the year 1607 and was probably less than correct in implying that a prior 
Missouri case existed which directly on-point endorsed the common law 
“proximate cause” rule.  However, the general historical claim that the 
legislature makes in subsections 1 and 2, that no dram shop liability had 
existed in Missouri apart from the Prohibition period and the 1980s cases, is 
correct.  To suggest otherwise, as the majority does, is misleading. 
Even if the legislature and this Note were completely incorrect on the 
history of dram shop liability in Missouri since Skinner, one cannot ignore the 
inescapable conclusion that the legislature intended, in subsections 1 and 2, to 
eliminate dram shop liability in Missouri.  The majority itself even seemed to 
endorse this notion, admitting that “[h]istorical references aside, if subsections 
1 and 2 of section 537.053 were the whole statute, we would accept the 
obvious proposition that the legislature had indeed abolished dram shop 
liability.”203  By saying that the legislature “purported” to eliminate dram shop 
 
 200. For an explanation of the Prohibition-era dram shop liability act, see discussion supra 
Part II.B. 
 201. For a discussion of the 1980s abrogation cases, see discussion supra Part II.D. 
 202. Carver, 647 S.W.2d at 573 (emphasis added). 
 203. Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 551. 
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liability in subsections 1 and 2, the majority acknowledges the legislature’s 
intent—to eliminate dram shop liability.204 
Ultimately, the majority’s holding in Kilmer, although not removing 
subsections 1 and 2 from the dram shop liability statute, effectively ignores 
them.  Since subsections 1 and 2 seem to eliminate dram shop liability, and the 
new court-severed subsection 3 creates liability, the majority must have 
weighed subsections 1 and 2 against subsection 3 in making its final holding.  
Since subsections 1 and 2 were based on poor legal history, the majority must 
have decided that the first two subsections were far too imprecise and unclear 
and that the newly construed subsection 3, creating dram shop liability, must 
control.205 
However, to weigh the viability of these sections against one another 
violates the standard canons of statutory construction in Missouri.  In 
interpreting statutes, courts presume that the legislature did not intend for any 
part of a statute to be without meaning or effect.206  Such a presumption is only 
overcome when no other conclusion is possible.207  “Each word, clause, 
sentence and section of a statute” has a meaning;208 a court should only ignore 
“words or figures when necessary to give effect to the manifest intention of the 
framers of the statute.”209  In Kilmer, the majority admitted that the legislature 
“purported” to eliminate dram shop liability in subsections 1 and 2, yet the 
majority nonetheless ignored those subsections in its decision.  Such a holding 
violates the canons of statutory interpretation in Missouri. 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. One could also argue that the court was literally following the direction of the statute as 
it then existed.  Subsections 1 and 2 eliminated dram shop liability.  Subsection 3, after the 
majority’s severance, created it.  However, subsection 3 also begins with the words, 
“Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2 of this section.”  The majority could argue that even though 
subsections 1 and 2 eliminate dram shop liability, subsection 3 as now construed should govern 
because the “notwithstanding” language places subsection 3 in a superior position to subsections 
1 and 2.  Such a reading, however, underlines the argument that section 537.053 is a statute with 
an identity crisis for taking away dram shop liability and then giving it right back. 
 206. Stiffelman v. Abrams, 655 S.W.2d 522, 531 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (finding that a nursing 
home resident’s actual damages did not disappear upon his death where a statute existed which 
allowed the deceased resident’s estate to file suit for the resident’s actual damages). 
 207. Missouri State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Southworth, 704 S.W.2d 219, 
225 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (refusing to read the phrase “as a profession” into a statute where the 
legislature had previously and specifically removed the phrase from the statute). 
 208. Hadlock v. Dir. of Revenue, 860 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a 
statute which allowed an exception to the best evidence rule for copies of various government 
documents did not also remove the requirement that the documents be authenticated). 
 209. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hackmann, 302 Mo. 558, 560 (Mo. 1924) (permitting the 
court to ignore a statute’s clerical error of listing the number “VI” instead of the intended the 
number “IV”). 
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V. RATIONALE FOR KILMER’S ACTIVISM: PERSONAL VIEWS OF PROPER LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND JUDICIAL AUTONOMY 
As shown in the above discussion of the Court’s reasoning in Kilmer, the 
Kilmer opinion is dominated by two important issues, namely whether the 
criminal conviction requirement is substantive or procedural and whether the 
court properly interpreted the legislature’s intent under the dram shop liability 
statute for purposes of the severability analysis.  Though the court found the 
criminal conviction requirement as procedural, it provided no significant 
analysis for why it did so.  In interpreting the legislature’s intent under the 
statute, the court delivered an opinion which clearly turns the legislature’s 
intent on its head.  In order to understand the majority’s decision on both of 
these issues, at least in part, one must consider two factors which go beyond 
the realm of pure legal reasoning: the judges’ personal views of proper legal 
development210 and the protection of judicial autonomy. 
Though not directly addressed in the majority’s opinion, one cannot ignore 
the politics involved in the passage of the dram shop liability statute and the 
more general background and views of the justices joining in the majority 
opinion.  The enactment of the dram shop liability statute in 1985 overturned a 
strong pro-plaintiff and health and safety movement in the Missouri courts on 
the dram shop liability issue.  With the passage of section 537.053, dram shop 
liability as enunciated in Carver vanished.  Though the Governor’s office 
assured that section 537.053 would provide dram shop liability if certain 
“qualifications” had been met,211 those “qualifications” served as an effective 
roadblock to dram shop liability in Missouri.212  As Richard McFadin, lobbyist 
for the Missouri Restaurant Association, said in 1985 as the new statute was 
enacted, “We think it’s one of the most important bills passed for restaurants in 
a long time.”213  The new dram shop liability statute represented a significant 
regression in plaintiffs’ rights, funded and supported by the restaurant, and 
presumably the alcoholic beverage brewing and distribution, industries.  On 
the other hand, a number of the justices endorsing the majority opinion in 
Kilmer had demonstrated their sympathies in recent opinions for pro-
 
 210. The author of the Kilmer opinion, Justice Michael A. Wolff, has himself advocated 
studying, especially through social science statistical analysis, “judicial politics, and in particular, 
examining state supreme courts” according to “personal, ideological, and electoral factors.”  See 
Michael A. Wolff, Exploring Judicial Behaviors in the Laboratories of Democracy, 83 
JUDICATURE 267 (2000). 
 211. Dvorak, supra note 71, at B1. 
 212. Although the number of actual criminal convictions under section 311.310 may have 
been few, Missouri case law suggests that such convictions did occur after the passage of section 
537.053.  See State v. Denton, 885 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Erickson, 874 
S.W.2d 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Miller, 750 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 213. Dvorak, supra note 71, at B1. 
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plaintiff214 and health and safety issues.215  For members of the majority, 
Kilmer presented an opportunity to construe a statute that represented the 
antithesis of their demonstrated sympathies.216 
Perhaps in an even more profound way, the Kilmer decision demonstrates 
the struggle between the legislature and the judiciary over what powers each 
branch of government should possess.  When the Court of Appeals adopted 
dram shop liability under the common law in Carver, the court explained that 
although “resolution of public policy arguments is primarily a function of the 
legislature, a court’s refusal to decide questions of public policy is a mistaken 
abdication of the function of a common law judge.”217  Thus, the Carver court 
felt justified in adopting dram shop liability in Missouri without approval from 
the legislature.218  The legislature, however, would quickly nullify that decision 
with the passage of section 537.053. 
Of course, simply modifying or abolishing causes of action under the 
common law, even according to the majority in Kilmer, is well within the 
 
 214. These pro-plaintiff sympathies can be seen in the recent judicial opinions that the justices 
have authored.  For Justice Wolff, see Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. 
2000) (suing an insurance company for vexatious refusal to pay does not preempt a plaintiff’s 
pursuit of other causes of action, such as defamation).  For Justice White, see Carlson v. K-Mart 
Corp., 979 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998) (in a case where a plaintiff had suffered injuries from the 
actions of two separate tortfeasors on two different occasions, instructing the jury that one of the 
defendants was only responsible for damages which “directly resulted” from the defendant’s 
conduct unfairly prejudiced the plaintiff).  For Justice Price, see Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. 
Hwy. & Trans. Co., 859 S.W.2d 681 (abrogating the old common enemy rule in surface water 
run-off situations that favored defendants using surface water for a new reasonable use rule which 
favors plaintiffs damaged by surface water). 
 215. These sympathies for health and safety issues can be seen in the following recent judicial 
opinions that the justices have authored.  For Justice Wolff, see State ex rel. K-Mart Corp. v. 
Holliger, 986 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1999) (finding that a Missouri resident could file suit in a 
Missouri court against the Michigan corporation K-Mart Corporation for a fall that the Missouri 
resident suffered in a K-Mart store in Colorado).  For Justice White, see Newman v. Ford Motor 
Co., 975 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. 1998) (finding that a statute which excluded evidence in a trial of a 
plaintiff’s failure to wear a safety belt in an automobile collision also applied in a products 
liability context against an automobile manufacturer).  For Justice Holstein, see Lough v. Rolla 
Women’s Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff could bring a tort 
action against a medical physician for negligent acts that the physician performed upon the 
plaintiff’s mother, even though such acts occurred before the plaintiff had been conceived). 
 216. “Her [Kilmer’s] attorney, James G. Krispin of Clayton, called the ruling a big win for 
people who are injured by drunks who are served liquor for consumption on the premises.  ‘It was 
virtually impossible’ to sue the responsible liquor establishment under the law requiring that the 
bar owner first be convicted of a criminal charge, Krispin said.”  Virginia Young, Court Makes It 
Easier to Sue Businesses in Alcohol-Related Car Accidents: State Law Had Banned Suits Unless 
Owner Was Convicted for Serving a Drunk Person, ST. LOUIS-POST DISPATCH, May 10, 2000, at 
B1. 
 217. Carver, 647 S.W.2d at 575. 
 218. Id. 
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powers of the legislature.219  While limiting a cause of action may be within 
the province of the legislature, absolute control over how such causes of action 
would be limited is not.  In Kilmer, the method that the legislature used to limit 
dram shop litigation sparked a fire amongst the majority of the court, for that 
method threatened the very autonomy and powers of the judiciary itself.220  
Limiting causes of action by providing that one only existed if a criminal 
conviction had been obtained placed enormous powers, in effect, upon the 
local prosecuting attorney to decide whether or not an individual had a cause of 
action.  If a prosecutor decided to pursue a criminal action against a tavern, and 
was successful, then an injured third party would have a civil action against the 
tavern.  If the prosecutor decided not to pursue a criminal action, the injured 
third party was left with nothing.  This effective discretion by the local 
prosecutor removed power and authority that a circuit court judge or jury 
would have held after the Carver decision.  Instead of a judge, on motions to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, or a jury, in a fact-finding situation, 
deciding whether a third party had a strong enough claim against a tavern, the 
local prosecutor, after the passage of section 537.053, now had this authority, 
or at the very least the first, and often only step in the decision-making process.  
The transfer of this authority from the judiciary to the executive clearly 
angered the majority in Kilmer, prompting the court to ask sarcastically and 
rhetorically why the state supervisor of liquor or the tavern owner’s state 
senator should not instead make such a decision.  Such strong disapproval over 
both the legislature’s view as to the proper development of the law and the 
legislature’s attempt to remove power from the judiciary in section 537.053 
surely helped to encourage an activist opinion in Kilmer which quite cleverly 
reinvented the legislature’s intent by employing technical and mechanical 
arguments and theories.221 
VI. EFFECT OF KILMER ON CURRENT MISSOURI STATUTORY LAW 
As a result of the Kilmer decision, any current Missouri statutes which 
employ procedural-type techniques to limit the number of causes of action 
filed may face serious doubts.  The Missouri Supreme Court has demonstrated 
its distaste for such measures, especially if they involve removing authority 
from the judicial branch and investing it in one of the other branches.  The 
 
 219. The Kilmer majority, however, noted that it could not find an instance where the 
legislature had “abolished a claim in its entirety.”  Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 554 n.24. 
 220. The majority in Kilmer also saw the way that the legislature had handled the “proximate 
cause” of injury issue in the statute as an encroachment upon judicial authority.  See discussion 
supra note 81. 
 221. Russell Watters, the attorney for the defendant restaurant in the Kilmer case commented 
after the opinion was delivered: “The legislature decides what public policy is, generally, not the 
courts.  But in this case, Justice Wolff has decided what the public policy should be.”  Young, 
supra note 216, at B1. 
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court has also shown its willingness not only to declare those procedural 
techniques unconstitutional under the open courts provision in the Missouri 
Constitution, but also to remove those pre-civil action requirements from the 
statute, leaving a much broader, more encompassing area of liability behind.222  
Any current Missouri statute that, like section 537.053, limits a cause of action 
may suffer a similar fate if challenged in the current Missouri Supreme Court. 
One area of Missouri statutory law that may prove problematic under the 
open courts and separation of powers rationale of Kilmer is the Missouri 
Omnibus Nursing Home Act.223  The Nursing Home Act sets forth a series of 
rights that nursing home residents possess when living in a nursing home in the 
state of Missouri.224  If one of those rights is violated by the nursing home, a 
nursing home resident or his or her family may have a cause of action against 
the nursing home.225  If a violation occurs, the resident or his or her family 
must file a complaint with the Missouri Attorney General’s office.226  The 
Attorney’s General office has sixty days after the complaint is filed to decide 
whether to pursue legal action, such as enjoining or restraining the facility 
from further violations of the Nursing Home Act,227 enjoining the nursing 
home’s acceptance of new residents pending substantial compliance with the 
Nursing Home Act,228 or commencing receivership proceedings.229  If the 
Attorney General’s office decides not to take any action, then the nursing home 
resident or his or her family may pursue a civil action against the nursing home 
for actual damages.230  However, if the Attorney General decides to pursue 
 
 222. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 223. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 198.003-198.186 (1979). 
 224. Such resident rights include, among others, the right to be free from physical and mental 
abuse, the right to participate in the planning of the resident’s total care and medical treatment, 
and the right not to be transferred or discharged unless necessary for the resident’s medical 
condition or for non-payment for the resident’s stay.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 198.088 (1979). 
 225. See MO. REV. STAT. § 198.093.3 (1979). 
 226. See § 198.093.1. 
 227. See § 198.093.3; Alan B. Hoffman & Karen E. Schreier, A Private Right of Action Under 
Missouri’s Omnibus Nursing Home Act, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 661, 675 n.133 (1981). 
 228. See § 198.093; MO. REV. STAT. § 198.067.1 (1979); Hoffman & Schreier, supra note 
227, at 675 n.133. 
 229. See § 198.093; MO. REV. STAT. § 198.099 (1979); Hoffman & Schreier, supra note 227, 
at 675 n.133. 
 230. If the Missouri Attorney General does not act within sixty days of his receipt of the 
complaint, then the resident or his estate has 240 days from the date of the filing of the complaint 
with the attorney general to file suit against the owner or operator of the nursing home for actual 
damages.  See § 198.093.3.  Long before the Kilmer decision, legal commentators have argued 
that the Nursing Home Act might also face constitutional problems under an open courts 
challenge because by forcing nursing home residents to wait at least sixty days before filing suit, 
the statute effectively hinders a resident’s right to “immediate temporary relief.”  See Hoffman & 
Schreier, supra note 227, at 675-77. 
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legal action against the nursing home, then the nursing home resident may not 
file a civil action against the nursing home.231 
As with the dram shop liability statute discussed in Kilmer, the Missouri 
legislature used the attorney general complaint process as a screening function 
to limit the number of civil actions that could be filed.232  Though different in a 
number of ways, potential plaintiffs under both the dram shop liability statute 
and the Nursing Home Act reply upon the decision of a member of the 
executive branch in determining whether those plaintiffs have a cause of 
action.  Under the dram shop act, the plaintiff needed the local county 
prosecutor to file and succeed in a criminal action against the tavern or 
restaurant before a civil cause of action existed.  Under the Nursing Home Act, 
a party must wait until the Attorney General’s office decides not to pursue an 
action against the nursing home before that individual has a cause of action.  
Though the two statutes are very different, in both cases the plaintiff is 
dependent upon the discretion of a member of the executive branch for the 
existence of his cause of action.  And under both statutes, the plaintiff, because 
of the executive branch officer’s decision, could be left without a remedy for 
his or her injury.233  If the court finds this pre-civil action requirement 
“arbitrary” or “unreasonable,” then the statute could face a serious 
challenge.234 
The similarities between the two statutes does not of necessity mean that 
the Missouri Supreme Court would strike down the attorney general complaint 
requirement in the Nursing Home Act.  After all, under the Nursing Home Act, 
the Missouri Attorney General does not have to undertake any legal action 
against the nursing home as the dram shop liability statute required of the local 
prosecutor.  A nursing home resident obtains a cause of action if the attorney 
general decides to do nothing—in fact, the attorney general’s doing nothing is 
required for a cause of action to arise.235  The key question is whether the court 
 
 231. Hoffman & Schreier, supra note 227, at 675-77. 
 232. See Steve Vossmeyer & Diane Felix, The Missouri Omnibus Nursing Home Act of 1979: 
A Legislative History, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 617, 644 (1981). 
 233. No where in the Nursing Home Act does it allow the attorney general to pursue a civil 
action for money damages for the plaintiff. 
 234. The court may find the attorney general complaint requirement “arbitrary” or 
“unreasonable” if evidence existed that demonstrated that the requirement effectively prevented 
any sort of legal action for statutory violations, such as if the Missouri Attorney General’s office 
performed sham or half-hearted legal actions against violating nursing homes in order to protect 
certain insurance companies and medical groups from significant liability. 
 235. This difference may well prove crucial.  Under section 537.053, if the criminal 
conviction requirement was not fulfilled, then no legal action against the dram shop would have 
occurred.  The Nursing Home Act, with its pre-civil action requirement, assures that some legal 
action against the nursing home would be pursued, either by the resident or his estate or by the 
Missouri Attorney General.  This distinction between the two statutes may serve to highlight the 
relative oddity of the criminal conviction requirement in section 537.053, and may also indicate 
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would classify the pre-civil action requirement as a procedural precondition to 
a cause of action, such as the criminal conviction requirement in the dram shop 
statute,236 or simply as part of the substantive law, such as the Labor and 
Industrial Relations Commission’s review of workers compensation cases.237  
The Missouri Supreme Court has not enunciated any clear rules for 
distinguishing between procedural and substantive law in the “open courts” 
context.  Therefore, if the current justices on the Missouri Supreme Court, who 
seem sympathetic to pro-plaintiff and pro-health and safety concerns, find this 
requirement an improper development of Missouri law, as well as an attack on 
the authority and autonomy of the judiciary, then the attorney general 
complaint requirement could also be severed from the Nursing Home Act 
under the Kilmer analysis. 
VII.  LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES FOR WORKING WITH KILMER 
In an era where tort reform has become a rather popular idea, it seems 
unlikely that the Missouri legislature would want to abandon its efforts to limit 
the number of civil actions filed under either existing or future statutes.  In 
order to maneuver around the Kilmer decision the legislature has two simple 
options.  First, legislators could make sure that justices sympathetic to pro-
plaintiff and pro-health and safety concerns are no longer accepted on the 
Missouri Supreme Court.  Second, the Missouri legislature could attempt to 
eliminate entire causes of action, or grant large fields of immunity.  However, 
neither of these solutions seems particularly viable politically, nor do they 
seem in step with traditional notions of good government. 
Perhaps the best way for the Missouri legislature to deal with the Kilmer 
decision in its future statutory enactments is not to try to circumvent Kilmer, 
but to work with it.238  The main problem in Kilmer that doomed the dram shop 
liability statute was the method in which the legislature attempted to limit the 
 
that the possibility of future activism by the current court in striking down other statutes is fairly 
limited.  However, the key question in analyzing the constitutionality of these pre-civil action 
requirements under Missouri law seems to be whether the court would hold that the requirement 
is a procedural condition precedent to a civil action or an actual element of the substantive law.  
As mentioned earlier, how the court would rule on this question is unpredictable.  See discussion 
supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 236. See Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 550. 
 237. See Goodrum, 824 S.W.2d at 10. 
 238. “[W]e [the Missouri Supreme Court] leave it to the legislature to decide whether the 
statute, as it remains, should be retained, repealed or modified in some constitutionally 
appropriate manner.”  Kilmer, 17 S.W.3d at 554.  As of the date of print of this Note, the 
Missouri legislature seems poised to repeal the dram shop liability statute, as modified by Kilmer, 
and fully shield taverns and restaurants from liability for the negligent sale of alcoholic 
beverages.  Bills in both houses of the Missouri legislature have been introduced which would 
accomplish this effect.  See Editorial, Drunken Driving: Taking Responsibility, ST. LOUIS POST 
DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 2001, at B2. 
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amount of litigation that the statute could produce, the criminal conviction 
requirement.  If the legislature truly wants to provide dram shop liability in 
cases so egregious that a criminal conviction would have been possible if 
pursued, the legislature can create constitutionally acceptable statutory 
language that could accomplish this result, such as by requiring heightened 
levels of intent by the tortfeasor. 
For example, the original version of Senate Bill 345 introduced by Senator 
Panethiere provided the following provisions describing what constituted 
“reckless” behavior by taverns or restaurants: 
1.  The service of alcoholic beverages is reckless when the server knows, or a 
reasonable person in his position should have known, that such service creates 
an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others that is substantially greater 
than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. 
2.  Specific serving practices that are admissible as evidence of reckless 
conduct include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) Active encouragement of intoxicated persons to consume substantial 
amounts of alcoholic beverages; 
(2) Service of alcoholic beverages to a person, eighteen years or under, 
when the server has actual or constructive knowledge of the patron’s age; 
(3) Service of alcoholic beverages to a person that is so continuous and 
excessive that it creates a substantial risk of death by alcohol poisoning; 
(4) The active assistance of a person into a motor vehicle when the person 
is so intoxicated that such assistance is required and the person giving 
assistance knows or should know that the intoxicated person intends to 
operate the motor vehicle.239 
At the time of the bill’s introduction, this section sought to define what 
constituted “reckless” behavior for the purposes of defining when an injured 
third party could obtain punitive damages against the dram shop owner, in 
addition to actual damages.240  However, the legislature could use this section 
as the standard that must be met for dram shop liability to arise.  While parts of 
this section could be tightened to remove any ambiguities or open questions of 
liability, this section could nonetheless serve as a model for how the legislature 
could still provide liability in a few egregious situations, yet limit the amount 
of total litigation, for simple negligence under this method would not give rise 
to a cause of action. 
Using this method to define when a cause of action exists would pass open 
courts and separation of powers scrutiny.  Without any pre-civil action 
 
 239. S.B. 345.  For a general discussion of this early version of the dram shop liability bill, 
see notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
 240. Id. 
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requirement, such a statutory scheme could only be described as substantive, 
thereby overcoming an open courts challenge.  Moreover, this method would 
not rely on a member of the executive branch to determine when a cause of 
action would arise; judges and juries would interpret this statutory standard 
based upon the facts before them and thus separation of powers would not pose 
a problem.  However, for the legislature to choose this method to limit 
litigation while still allowing some liability would force the legislature to trust 
the judiciary to interpret the statutory language in a manner consistent with the 
legislature’s intent.  The absence of this sort of legislative trust in the judiciary, 
however, provided the impetus in part for the development of section 537.053.  
The analysis provided in Kilmer does not help develop this trust, either.  As 
mentioned earlier, though, this alternative method may prove to be the only 
politically viable solution. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
From its analysis of the history of dram shop liability in Missouri to its 
interpretation of the legislature’s intent behind section 537.053, the majority 
opinion in Kilmer may prove to be one of the most activist interpretations of 
Missouri statutory law in recent history.  However, the lessons of Kilmer are 
fairly clear.  The current members of the Missouri Supreme Court will not 
tolerate subversion of judicial autonomy through the legislature’s use of 
procedural limiting devices, especially if the devices limit the types of civil 
actions for which the current bench may hold sympathies.  Moreover, the 
current court has shown no hesitancy in removing these pre-civil action 
requirements from statutes, and in the process of doing so, creating rather large 
and broad areas of liability.  Only by enacting descriptive, and therefore 
constitutionally acceptable statutes will the Missouri legislature assure itself 
that its attempts to limit litigation will not be held unconstitutional. 
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